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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION THROUGH PEACE AGREEMENTS BASED ON
THE POWER-SHARING MODEL

By

MARCELA OTAVIO GUEDES

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Abstract

The last four decades have seen a reconceptualization of the term's "peace", "conflict" and "security", as different forms of conflict have emerged, particularly since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990's. These reconceptualization's have brought about different studies, which have offered new forms of concept resolution tools and models aimed at assisting societies to end conflicts and achieve peace. The concept of power-sharing has two different models: centripetal and consociational respectively, both of which aim to establish conditions that enable the resolution of conflicts and the institution of peace in societies which are ethnically divided. 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland is a very strong example of both the benefits and limitations of using a power-sharing model to establish and maintain peace in society. This work aims to investigate and analyse this conflict, with a view to explaining how the conflict emerged and endured over the course of more than thirty years; and how it eventually reached a point where a power-sharing model could be instituted, and lasting peace achieved, in a society which endured significant violence and trauma which is still remembered to this day.

A critical analysis of conflict resolution through peace agreements based on the power-sharing model

1. Introduction

“Conflict is an unavoidable reality of life. It occurs for many reasons, such as societal issues and differences of opinion between people (Cahn and Abigail, 2014).”

Conflicts are part of daily life - either directly, by those who face their terrors, or indirectly, through the transmission of all dimensions of the conflict, whether they are part of a country's history or not; it can be claimed that they are a necessity. It is very unlikely that two people will view all things in the same way all the time; being physically separated makes it possible to see things in a unique way, and different lived experiences give different perspectives on different topics. Therefore, conflict tends to be regularly present in our lives. While this may seem negative, it can actually be positive, because conflict can help to provide viewpoints into other people's perspectives and opinions, which can help individuals to eventually be more understanding of each other.

Conflicts are characterized in different ways because their causes are not always the same. Therefore, the techniques and methods used for conflict resolution and peacebuilding should consider the peculiarities of each conflict, as each case is different (Paris, 2004).

With the end of the Cold War (1990) there was a change in the causes that originated conflicts in general, which became mostly internal conflicts provoked by reasons of segregation/separation, ethnicity or power. This bred the need to look at conflicts differently and led to positions for researchers in the areas of conflict resolution and peacebuilding practices (Ramsbotham et al., 2011).

On the other hand, over time, new dynamics are being introduced and, as conflicts increase in violence, the greater is the need to diffuse them at international level. It can require significant efforts which might end up involving other countries; or because of international pressure from citizens to provide assistance in resolving the conflict, as they are being directly affected by the events taking place in the conflict. The case of Northern Ireland serves as an example, because, for one side, the United States intervened to provide support to end the conflict due to the strong Irish-American community in North America. On the other hand, from 1970 the United Kingdom began to intervene in an attempt to resolve the conflict through a peace agreement between the parties as a result of international pressure (Hain, 2007).

Conflicts differ in their causes and can be triggered by political, ethnic, religious, social and economic reasons. Certain conflicts will need to be handled differently, according to their specificities.

Two basic elements or characteristics of conflict are time and complexity. With regard to time, it is possible that conflict can endure for short periods of time, but it can also be prolonged over many years. In terms of complexity, conflicts can take place for very simple reasons, while they can also arise due to very complicated situations too. Conflicts which are very complicated in nature can be referred to as 'intractable' or 'protracted'. This work will focus on intractable conflict (Conflict in Northern Ireland – the Troubles).

Bar-Tal describes intractable conflict as the type of conflict which contains some form of consensus. These types of conflicts are very difficult to resolve peacefully, and they can also last for very long periods of time because the parties involved are not prepared to compromise with each other in an attempt to achieve a peaceful situation (Bar-Tal, 2013).

It is common for intractable conflicts to be violent in nature. Modern examples of these types of conflicts include: the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan; the Kurdish conflict with the Turks; the Chechen conflict with Russia; and the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine. The common element in these conflicts is that one party is attempting to gain independence and freedom from the other. It is also the case that most "terrorist" conflicts are intractable conflicts because, by their nature, the parties are strongly opposed to each other and are not willing to compromise or give up their ideological positions (Steinmeyer, 2017).

This work, through the employment of a qualitative research method, aims to assess the extent to which agreements are the best form of conflict resolution and if they are sufficiently stable and durable, with a focus on the conflict in Northern Ireland (the Troubles). The case in Northern Ireland is very particular as there were three first attempts to reach an agreement, which were not successful, and the agreement was only formalized in 1999. This leads to questions, such as: what measures were introduced, and what were the changes compared to the previous agreement attempts which made it possible to materialize the agreement?

This study will serve to answer the following questions: What are the elements that can enable or facilitate durable and stable peace? What are the latent weaknesses in these peace agreements and how can these weaknesses lead to new conflicts in the future? Will the power-sharing model be capable and sufficiently powerful in resolving religious/political (internal) conflicts?

In order to answer these questions, this work will be structured in five chapters. The first chapter is this introduction, followed by the second chapter which is the literature review. The literature review

will provide a presentation of the fundamental theories and concepts for understanding the topic to be addressed. The concepts covered will be conflict, peace, violence, security, and peacebuilding, as well as the concept of power-sharing. The power-sharing theories (models) will also be comprehensively examined.

Generally, the concept of power-sharing is presented as a proposal for a model of peace building in cases of conflict in the form of a political agreement between the opposing parties (Gates, 2007). However, the way to achieve power-sharing as a way of management and subsequent conflict resolution in deeply divided societies has given rise to different views. In turn, this gave rise to different theories, among which Donald Horowitz and Arend Lijphart created two models of power-sharing, namely the centripetal and consociational models, respectively (Carvalho, 2016). Due to their relevance to the case study, they will be explained in this work.

The third chapter discusses the research methods used in this work, while the fourth will cover the history of the conflict in Northern Ireland (the Troubles) from 1968 to 1998 which originated from the antagonism surrounding the political future of the territory, in relation to the permanence of the union to the United Kingdom or to its separation and the possible unification of Ireland.

The Troubles resulted in the division of the Irish people into two completely opposite views at the religious and political level. The political aspect was the most relevant and main cause of the conflict because it was about the search and fight for the position of those who would be in control and power of the Northern Ireland's territory. The conflict ended in 1998 with an agreement, which sought to combine the interests of unionists and nationalists. It was the first agreement to include the paramilitary forces from both parties (Fenton, 2018).

The fourth chapter will present an explanation and analysis of the three peace agreements signed in Northern Ireland during the Troubles. The Sunningdale Agreement (1973), the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) and, finally, the Good Friday Agreement signed in 1998 but which only became effective in 1999. The first two agreements paved the way towards the conciliation of the parties in the 1998 agreement.

The analysis of the agreements will be carried out with the aim to indicate the principles on which they were based and to determine what changes were made over the three agreements.

In short, this work is based on peacebuilding theories such as *peacebuilding*, peace and conflict concepts (definitions), as well as power-sharing models/theories. For this purpose, the Northern Ireland conflict (the Troubles) will be used as a case study, focusing more precisely on the peace agreements signed over the course of the conflict. The aim is to understand if, through the analysis of these agreements, there was a successful construction of peace by the application of the power-sharing model,

as well as understanding the role of power-sharing in the resolution of religious/political (internal) conflicts.

2. Literature review

2.1 Introduction

This literature review aims to give an overview of the main arguments and theories related to this research topic, as well as key authors who will contribute significantly to this research.

As previously stated, this work will review literature based on conflict, conflict resolution, peace and peace agreements, violence, security, and power-sharing theories (models). It will also present the conflict in Northern Ireland (the Troubles) and use that as a case study with the aim to understand the importance of power-sharing methods in relation to solving religious/political (internal) conflicts.

2.2 General concepts and theories

Peace processes involve different dynamics between actors that differ from conflict to conflict. Since the contexts of all conflicts tend to be unique, it cannot be claimed that all peace processes are the same - each case is unique and characterized by specific elements.

What is proposed in this chapter is an exposition of the concepts and theories that are considered fundamental for the understanding of the entire peace process from the moment of the negotiation to the creation or drafting of an agreement between the parties involved. This analysis is essential when considering the conflict in Northern Ireland (The Troubles) as a case study and more precisely for the understanding of this dissertation theme – as it allows us to deduce whether power-sharing models can enable the resolution of religious/political (internal) conflicts.

Peace and conflict studies will be analysed, along with concepts like violence and security, as they allow us to perceive the difficulties and what is needed to establish a peace agreement between parties. Often, the incompatibilities between opposition parties in conflict are so many that it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to reach agreement. Those differences can be ethnic, political, or religious. In conflicts which are difficult to resolve, there are also cases in which one or more parties, after recognizing how difficult it will be to be victorious, seek an agreement that guarantees them at least a place in the negotiation process, with the aim of sharing at least some of the power - This is the idea linked to the concept of power-sharing.

It is relevant to note that power-sharing is mainly associated with conflicts of political origin, because it usually enables the creation of a system of governance in which all parties involved in the conflict obtain a certain percentage of the power, meaning that their rights and interests will be represented (Sisk, 2003).

In general, all the concepts explained here are interlinked and relevant when discussing the case study being investigated and the theme of this dissertation.

Peace, security, and violence are intrinsically correlated, since the durability and stability of peace as well as the achievement of it depend on the absence of violence. Thus, it is essential to define conflict, and to analyse the process of transition from a conflictual situation (with violence) to a situation of peace, where the dominant characteristic is 'negative peace' – which refers to the absence of conflict (Galtung, 1969).

Furthermore, it is essential to also address the evolution of the terms 'peace' and 'security', concepts which have been the subject of critical analysis by several authors.

For this, in the first part of the study, dimensions of conflicts will be analysed, exposing some of the predominant causes (and revealing the fact that the causes are and can be very diverse).

2.3 The Conceptualization of Conflict and the evolution of conflict studies

A society is founded on the basis of several aspects, such as its type, its needs, its constitution, and other relevant characteristics (features). After defining these steps (features), the final result will be a society constituted by a group of individuals who are united by the sharing of a culture and who have social relationships and various levels of participation and partnerships within the society.

However, societies are not always composed of individuals who share the same ideals, and may therefore have incompatible interests and different objectives, which can ultimately lead to conflict. Conflicts are the result of rival or competing interests, opinions, ideas, perceptions and values among individuals (Podusova, 2017).

Disagreements between parties may be due to economic, political, social or power struggles, whether derived from the desire to impose a religion, or the values of a certain group to another in the same society, through the use of force (Jeong, 2010).

As Ho-Won Jeong states:

“The pursuit of different objectives leads to interference in each other’s activities to prevent an opponent from attaining what one group desires (...). A minority group may seek outright independence, but the state

controlled by a majority ethnic group may oppose the aspiration and even suppress rights to ethnic language and religion” (Jeong, 2010, p. 6).

In this way, it appears that conflicts may vary in their causes as they can be intra-personal, inter-personal, inter-group, inter-state, global or conflict within a State (intra-state conflicts) (Folarin, 2014). Each of these types of conflict has unique characteristics that differ from each other. As a result, it is necessary to study these conflicts in a unique way, taking into account their peculiarities, with the aim to understand how to reduce violence and achieve its resolution.

Although the subject of conflict study also has its origins in other influences, it was in the mid-1950s that this area began to be developed by a “relatively organised and coherent group of scholars (...) in Stanford and Michigan” (Ryan, 2003, p. 75). The subject developed according to the events that were taking place internationally, focusing on problems such as “strengthening international law, promoting disarmament and building a collective security system as an alternative to the discredited balance of power approach” (Ryan, 2003, p. 75).

However, after the Cold War, the field of conflict studies changed radically when it came to the various forms of conflict resolution. The main reason for this was the predominance and escalation of internal conflicts that were increasingly intensified, triggered mainly for religious and ethnic reasons, thus marking the end of an era of bipolarity (Stern; Druckman, 2000).

These new conflicts, which Mary Kaldor called “new wars”, were different to previous conflicts before the Cold War, mainly in relation to the types of conflicting parties, their objectives, the types of methods employed in the conflicts, and the forms of financing that parties availed of. According to the author, these new conflicts were fought on the grounds of political, ideological or geographical interests, or even for identity issues, whether ethnic or religious. In addition, the parties were diverse, from paramilitaries to contracted private security forces, and used political methods to achieve their goals (Kaldor, 2013).

At the beginning of the 1990’s, despite the diminishment in the threat of world extinction due to the improvement in relations between the global superpowers, internal conflicts gained a greater predominance, becoming new major threats that needed to be faced (Ramsbotham et al., 2011). With this, the area of conflict investigation, which focuses on causes of conflicts, evolved, and started to focus on conflict resolution measures, with an emphasis on showing each conflicts particular characteristics (Kaldor, 2013).

In this way, there was a change in the international approach to conflict studies, with the study of other domains, which were not related to nuclear weaponry or power, but became areas of investigation,

namely "'non-traditional conflicts' and 'new wars', such as ethnic conflicts, broader definitions of security to include human security, and issues related to democratization" (Ryan, 2003, p. 77).

Christopher E. Miller reinforces the idea that the international community in this period (the post-Cold War era) was increasingly concerned with the increase in the prevalence of these internal conflicts, which "include civil and ethnic wars, anti-colonial struggles, secessionist and autonomous movements, territorial conflicts, and battles over control of government" (Miller, 2005, p. 22).

Ethnic conflicts are associated with nationalism and studies of ethnicity as well as political violence. The investigation of conflict studies, in relation to ethnicity, increased with the end of the Cold War. The search to find and explain the causes of ethnic conflicts led to a connection between what constituted national security dilemmas and ethnic conflicts from 1990 onwards (Xu, 2012).

2.4 The evolution of the study of peace: How does peace evolve? Types of peace and the triangle of violence

As previously stated, the area of conflict studies, and specifically the study of the causes of conflicts, has experienced significant growth, especially after the end of the Cold War, which coincided with an increase in internal conflicts. At the same time, peace studies also became more popular, with an increased focus on studying conflicts and investigating paths to resolving them peacefully.

The term "peace" has several definitions from many authors. According to Christopher Miller, in his work *A Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies*, peace is a "political condition that ensures justice and social stability through formal and informal institutions, practices, and norms" (Miller, 2005, p. 55).

Johan Galtung, who was the founder of the discipline (peace studies) and also founded the *International Peace Research Institute* in Oslo in 1959, defined peace "as a synonym for stability or equilibrium" (Galtung, 1967, p. 12). Peace can be related to the internal state of an individual – a person can be at peace with him/herself, even in situations of violence. For example, on the battlefield, soldiers can be at peace with themselves even though they're engaging in combat (Galtung, 1967).

However, in 1969, Galtung provided a different definition of the term in his article *Violence, Peace and Peace Research*, when he stated that peace is intrinsically linked to violence, insofar as they are inseparable terms which depend on each other. According to Galtung, for peace to exist, there cannot be violence, and an absence of violence is a fundamental condition for peace (Galtung, 1969).

The change in Galtung's definition of peace highlights the evolution of the author's thinking in relation to the concept, and also illustrates its complexity.

Peace studies is a complex area that focuses on conflict resolution through peaceful means, with a view to building total peace. For this, it is naturally necessary to analyse and investigate conflicts.

Conflicts are also complex to analyse due to their particularities, as usually individual conflicts don't develop and occur in the exact same way as each other, although their origins can be similar (political, religious, ethnic, economic).

According to Hobbes, whose studies were centred on the study of human nature and the natural state of humanity, conflicts are the result of a "competition for gain, fear of insecurity, and defence of honour" (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p. 79). For Machiavelli, the origin of conflict was linked to the desire for power (Ramsbotham et al., 2011).

The variety of different opinions and thoughts related to conflict is why 'peace studies' is considered a complex area, and, as stated above, the focus of peace studies has changed over the years, particularly after the Cold War. This change is linked to the predominance of conflicts taking place within the borders of State's (intra-state conflict) or internal conflicts, due to the growth of nationalist and ethnic movements, as opposed to more traditional conflicts between States (interstate conflict). (Yilmaz, 2008).

Therefore, there was a transition in the focus of conflict studies; originally it focussed on analysing wars and their causes, but in the post-cold war era, the focus shifted more to peacebuilding and the conditions necessary to achieve peace. In this way, peace studies is defined as an area whose main objective is the analysis of the conditions needed to reduce and eliminate wars, and for the resolution of conflicts through peaceful means (Lawler, 2008).

As previously mentioned, an important figure in the field of peace studies is Galtung, as he is considered the person who established this area of research and conducted the first studies into what the necessary conditions for peace are. Throughout his research, the author has reformulated his understanding of peace and violence - and this evolution of thought is visible throughout his works.

In his 1967 work, Galtung defined peace as an individual condition and also defended the idea of peace as the absence of violence, or negative peace (Galtung, 1967). He also proposed both negative peace and positive peace.

Negative peace relates to the absence of violence (in the sense of physical force) and positive peace refers to integration and cooperation between individuals (Galtung, 1967); in effect a multicultural respect, in which all religions, cultures and ethnicities are respected and principles such as freedom, justice and equality of rights are guaranteed and minorities are protected (Olanrewaju, 2013).

In 1969, Johan Galtung presented the findings of his latest study relating to peace, in which he contemplated how the term peace is used very often, and because of this, it is important to explain what constitutes peace.

According to Galtung, it is necessary to think about the term peace based on three primary notions: “1. The term ‘peace’ shall be used for social goals at least verbally agreed to by many, if not necessarily by most. 2. These social goals may be complex and difficult, but not impossible, to attain. 3. The statement “peace is absence of violence” shall be retained as valid” (Galtung, 1969, p. 167).

These principles describe one of the types of peace already mentioned, ‘negative peace’, which is characterized by the absence of physical violence defined by Galtung in 1969. Its opposite is called ‘positive peace’, which is defined by cooperation between groups of people, and which also acts as a barrier to the emergence and/or re-emergence of conflicts, while also promoting the inclusion of all social groups. This inclusion is achieved through the fight against social injustices and the equal and impartial distribution of resources, as well as the distribution of ‘power’ through all societal groups through measures such as disarmament (Lawler, 2008).

In his research “*Violence, Peace, and Peace Research*” from 1969, Johan Galtung concluded that peace consists of more than the absence of violence or conflict; this led him to establish the so-called triangle of violence (Grewal, 2003). In the triangle, each point represents a form of violence exposed in cases of conflict (Freire; Lopes, 2009).


His 1969 work represents an evolution of Galtung's thoughts from his previous work in 1967; not only because of the creation of the triangle of violence, but also because of the new definition of violence, which encompassed three forms of violence in Galtung's view. Galtung firstly defined violence as an act that “is presented when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations” (Galtung, 1969, p. 168). However, Galtung recognized that this definition, which referred to “potential realizations”, is limited and the notion of violence is much broader. This led him to identify and distinguish between different forms of violence: direct violence; structural violence and cultural violence. These are the types of violence which constitute the triangle of violence and encompass psychological or physical violence, overt or latent violence, and intentional or unintentional violence (Galtung, 1969).

Structural violence is a type of indirect violence, which arises as a result of the “social structure itself – between humans, between sets of humans (societies), between sets of societies (alliances, regions) in the world” (Galtung, 1996, p. 2). That is, structural violence refers to the exclusion of certain groups from accessing the same rights as the rest of the population (Galtung, 1969).

Cultural violence, which was discussed by Galtung in his study *“Cultural Violence”* in 1990, refers to the cultural aspects and norms that are developed to establish what is acceptable and unacceptable in society, taking into account, for example, religion, art, education, and ideologies. It establishes the normative framework of a given society, and “can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence” (Galtung, 1990, p. 291).

Direct violence refers to the combination of psychological and physical violence exerted directly towards an individual by another party (Freire; Lopes, 2009).

To clearly understand the term ‘violence’ and its various forms, Galtung formulated the graph below:



GALTUNG, 1969, p. 173

In 1990, Galtung reformulated his definition of violence, defining it as “avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible. Threats of violence are also violence” (Galtung, 1990, p. 292). It can be argued that this definition represented a further broadening of the concept of violence than the authors previous definitions.

As previously mentioned, Galtung distinguished between three forms of violence: direct violence (which can be exercised by any actor, in or by a group, or individually); cultural violence (carried out to legitimize direct and structural violence); and structural violence (which arises because of the non-guarantee of basic human needs due to specific institutions and structures within a country) (Galtung; Fischer, 2013). According to Galtung, structural and direct violence result in four basic human needs: survival, freedom, well-being, and identity (as shown in the table below, developed by Galtung):

Table 4.1 A typology of violence. *Source* The author

	Survival needs	Well being needs	Identity needs	Freedom needs
Direct violence	Killing	Maiming	Desocialization Resocialization	Repression Detention
Structural violence	Exploitation A	Exploitation B	Secondary citizen Penetration Marginalization	Expulsion Segmentation Fragmentation

In his 2013 study, Galtung reinforced his idea of the concept of peace, by affirming that peace cannot be examined or observed as just an opposite to war; that is, confining peace studies to the mere investigation of the causes of conflicts in an attempt to find ways to prevent them from occurring (especially large-scale wars) restricts the sphere of conflict analysis (Galtung; Fischer, 2013).

With his 'triangle of violence', Galtung not only intended to develop the meaning of the concept of violence, but also sought to instigate a conversation around the concept of peace, using the same dimensions that he had previously employed when describing different types of violence - cultural, structural, and direct peace. He wanted to research the structural dynamics behind repression and exploitation and the symbolic violence present in different forms of ideology, religion, language, art, science, law, in the media and in education. Galtung's study of the various types of peace and violence influenced several authors, which led to an extension in the research focus of peace studies (Freire; Lopes, 2008).

The concepts of peace and violence have been broadened as they no longer focus just on State or international dynamics, but also ethnic motivations, self-determination, and political control, which characterized the nature of conflicts that became prominent after the Cold War (Yilmaz, 2008).

The lack of consensus on the definitions of violence and peace was reinforced by Håkan Wiberg, who claimed that a common understanding of both concepts is only likely to occur within extremely small communities (Wiberg, 2005). Also, in relation to the idea of widening the agenda of peace studies, Hylke Tromp claimed that "(...) peace research has become what a black hole is in astronomy (...)" (Tromp, 1981: xxvii cited in Wiberg, 2005, p. 3).


It can be concluded that there are several definitions of peace based on the views of different researchers, which, according to Håkan Wiberg, makes sense, as the values that give rise to these conceptualizations are formed differently because they arise from different cultural and political perspectives and realities (Wiberg, 2005).

According to Galtung, the main aim of peace studies is to understand how violence works because, by gaining this understanding, it can be stopped through a peacebuilding process that employs different methods of cooperation between the respective parties (Galtung; Fischer, 2013).

Galtung developed a new approach which focused on an overall analysis of the conflict and its resolution, developing a special interest by ethnic conflict as well as John Burton, whose analysis focused on human needs (Ryan, 2003). Thus, in the same way that Galtung constructed the triangle of violence, he also elaborated on it with 'the conflict triangle' shown in the figure below:

observe behavior, called B. Both A and C are at the latent, theoretical, inferred level. The three together add up to the conflict triangle in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1 *The Conflict Triangle*



According to Galtung, "a contradiction may be experienced as illustration, where a goal is being blocked by something, leading to aggressiveness as an attitude and to aggression as behaviour". (Galtung, 1996, p. 72). In effect, violence takes place when aggressive behaviour is incompatible with a person's conception of happiness, thus giving rise to a new contradiction and consequently the violence progression becoming a vicious cycle with no end in sight.

On the other hand, Ho-Won Jeong presents a different idea regarding conflict. For him, the conflict is evidenced by an "adversarial social action, involving two or more actors with the expression of differences often accompanied by intense hostilities" (Jeong, 2010, p. 3). According to the author, conflicts emerge due to an inability to manage or deal with incompatible relationships within a State; however, these conflicts can be resolved peacefully, without direct confrontation taking place between the opponent parties, if they seek to resolve their disputes through a negotiation process which is aimed at reaching an agreement (Jeong, 2010).

As Ho-Won Jeong explained in '*Understanding Conflict and Conflict analysis*', conflicts have taken place since the beginning of time, and they will likely be ever-present forever. As a result, the author highlighted the importance of learning how to deal with and manage various types of conflict and gaining an understand of the parties involved and their respective values and goals. Furthermore, he believed that the most dangerous types of conflicts are internal conflicts, such as civil wars. Based on this belief, he was eager to highlight the importance of studying human behaviour and the environment in which individuals are raised, because these studies can provide information that can be used to find ways to solve conflicts of this nature (Jeong, 2008).

While some conflicts seem to have no end, it is possible for some to be resolved. Examples include South Africa, whose conflict of apartheid ended after decades of violence with the implementation of new institutions, or the case of Northern Ireland, where the sectarian violence that took place ended with the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. These two cases show that it is possible that violent situations can be lessened, and, in some instances, conflicts can be ended, and peace achieved (Jeong, 2008). However, the negotiation processes needed to achieve peace are complicated and difficult, and they usually require the participation of outside parties to serve as mediators in order to enable communication between the conflicting parties (Jeong, 2010).

2.5 Security Concept: The Security Dilemma

Like the concept of peace, the concept of security has also been studied more and investigated further in recent years. Security and peace are interconnected, because it can be argued that it is not possible achieve a state of peace without feeling secure and vice versa.

Security is seen as associated with the power quest' – concept that became more complex after the Cold War period, with the emergence of the so-called 'new wars' (Stone, 2009).

As previously stated, the investigation of internal conflicts became more prevalent after the Cold War, because a better understanding of both the causes and ways of preventing conflicts was needed, as was information around how to construct long-term peacebuilding strategies.

The security dilemma began to be developed in 1951 by John H. Herz. This dilemma refers to the notion that a state can seek to increase its security in a defensive way, through the accumulation of weapons. Naturally, this action can be perceived by a neighbouring state as a threat to its own security, with the knock-on effect being that it ends up accumulating more arms itself. Consequently, the first state might perceive that the second state is preparing itself for conflict. This escalation of tension can lead to unnecessary war, provoked by a misunderstanding between the parties (Gunitskiy, 2011). In effect, the

use of violence as a way to secure power is a recurring pattern. Armed groups often act on orders to kill innocent people without question, or because they support certain ideals which they feel justify their actions (Jeong, 2000).

It is known that the concepts of peace, violence and security are linked to each other. From 1990, the concept of the security dilemma began to be used to explain ethnic violence and ethnic conflicts. According to its founders Herz, Butterfield and Jervis, the security dilemma has eight major components. Of these, there are three in particular which the authors highlight: (i) the lack of evil intentions on either side; (ii) anarchy; (iii) 'power accumulation'. According to the authors' logic, "Anarchy generates uncertainty; uncertainty leads to fear; fear then leads to power competition; power competition activates the (dormant) security dilemma; and the activated security dilemma leads to war through a spiral" (Tang, 2011, p. 515).

The security dilemma has been the subject of extensive analysis by several authors who have corroborated with the studies of Herz, Butterfield and Jervis or refuted this idea, as is the case of Kaufman and Roe. According to the conception of Herz, Butterfield and Jervis, the security dilemma cannot be employed for ethnic conflict matters. However, this idea is rejected by Roe and Kaufman (Tang, 2011).

On the other hand, authors such as Jiaxing Xu used the security dilemma concept to explain ethnic conflicts: these conflicts are characterized by the involvement of two distinct groups of unequal ethnic identities. The main reasons for ethnic conflicts are issues or disagreements related to ethnicity. They are triggered with a view to obtaining political autonomy through separation and becoming an independent state (Xu, 2012).

In the same way that the concepts of peace and violence were developed by organizations such as the UN, or researchers within the scope of International Relations, the conceptualization of security has also expanded, encompassing not only the security of States, but also the security of the planet and population. Miller presents security as "'the basic concept of human security', defined as safety from 'such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression', and 'protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions'" (Miller, 2001, p. 13). However, "the traditionalist approach to security persists in defining the field of security studies exclusively in terms of 'the study of the threat, use, and control of military force'" (Miller, 2001, p. 13).

What the concepts of peace and security have in common with each other is the lack of a consensual definition because both are very complex (Wiberg, 2005), and the meaning of each concept tends to be defined according to each society and culture. Cultural and political aspects must be taken

into account, because they determine the emphasis that each society will give to issues such as justice, welfare, social order, and absence of war, among others (Galtung, 1981 cited in Wiberg, 2005, p. 22).

Traditionally, the concept of security has been constituted according to five variables: (i) the origin of potential threats, (ii) the nature of these threats, (iii) the response to these threats, (iv) who is responsible for providing security, (v) what the defence values of the State are (Miller, 2001). However, because this idea is based around the State and its focus on different types of military response, this concept of security ended up facing many criticisms specifically because “the traditionalist approach to security persists in defining the field of security studies exclusively in terms of ‘the study of the threat, use, and control of military force’” (Miller, 2001, p. 19).

At the end of the Cold War, a new approach to security emerged, which expressed the idea that the real threats to security are embedded within States themselves, and not externally. That is, instead of focussing on external threats, the focus should be internal, as the greatest threats are those which States pose to their citizens. Examples include the violation of citizens rights (political or social) and the committing of atrocities against human life, such as ‘ethnic cleansings’, along with the differentiation of citizens by the State according to their gender, religion, ethnicity, or skin colour (Miller, 2001).

One of the authors who criticizes the traditional conceptualisation of security is Barry Buzan. According to Buzan, “Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change which they see as hostile. The bottom line of security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence” (Buzan, 1991, pp. 432-433).

In effect, Buzan (2007) claimed that the concept of security was very limited, so he defended its expansion to include other domains, in addition to the traditional vision of security based on the notions of peace and power (Buzan, 2007). Buzan considered that security should encompass the dimensions of individuals, States, and international systems; an idea that is denoted in his work *“People, States & Fear”* (Buzan, 2007). In addition to these, the author identified other areas interconnected with security, namely: military, environmental, economic, political, and social aspects that were expanded upon in his article *“New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century”*, and which, according to the author, marked fundamental concerns related to security (Buzan, 1991).

As Miller presented, “Military conflicts result primarily from problems of domestic legitimacy, such as revolutionary challenges to the legitimacy of elites and political regimes or from ethno-national challenges to the legitimacy of states and their boundaries [...]” (Miller, 2001, p. 19). Furthermore, there is a view that cultural and identity issues are also a threat to societies. As these new causes of conflict are

being identified, the ways to solve them are also changing. The author concluded that the most effective forms of conflict resolution are through peaceful means that focus on the internal dynamics within the State, such as economic development, state building, or democratization (Miller, 2001).

2.6 Peace Process: Peacebuilding by peaceful means (Agreements)

The predominance of internal conflicts, or “new wars”, as Mary Kaldor presented them, which are characterized by extreme violence, prompted an urgency to respond and solve them for organisations such as the UN, through military interventions and the establishment of bases, with the aim of slowly building peace (Kaldor, 2013).

Following its meeting in 1992 with the Heads of State and Government of member states of the Security Council, the General Secretary of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, wrote a paper titled “*An Agenda for Peace*”. In the paper, he presented a range of suggestions regarding ways to strengthen and make more efficient the ability of the United Nations in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

The model presented by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in *An Agenda for Peace* was based on the peace model proposed by Johan Galtung, which consisted of four headings: (i) preventive diplomacy, (ii) peacemaking, (iii) peacekeeping and (iv) peacebuilding. In the context of this study, the approaches that are relevant are peacebuilding and peacemaking, which both aim to resolve conflicts peacefully, through dialogue between the opposition parties, and mediation involving the negotiation of political agreements.

The term peace process refers to the evolution of a situation of violence to a phase where the conflict is resolved, and violence is no longer present. However, it is difficult to determine the start and end dates of peace processes, not least because these processes are usually marked by several ceasefires that are broken, and also taking into account that wars do not end instantly, thus revealing their complexities. According to Tonge (2014), a peace process “is defined as the active attempt at the prevention and management of conflict between and within states, a remit covering the treatment of inter-state, inter-communal and intra-communal violence” (Tonge, 2014, p. 7).

The idea of negative peace introduced by Galtung, which translates into the absence of conflict and violence, was rejected by Tonge, who believed that peace processes require more than just an absence of conflict and the willingness of the parties to negotiate (Tonge, 2014).

Peace processes contain various challenges for those trying to construct them, such as managing the conflicting parties. Even if they agree to participate in the negotiation of a peace agreement, one or more parties may undermine the process through different means such as violence and intimidation,

because not all parties may be prepared to comply with and make the necessary sacrifices to achieve an agreement (Stedman, 2008). Guelke reinforced the argument that negotiations that aim to end conflicts often fail, because the different parties usually have opposing goals (Guelke, 2008).

For negotiations to be successful and for reconciliation between the parties to be achieved, it is essential to move from violence to dialogue by establishing an agreement that ends the violence (Lederach, 2008). Essentially, the success of the negotiation will depend on both the willingness of the parties to make compromises, as well as the ability of political leaders to develop relationships with opposing parties (Guelke, 2008).

According to Guelke, there are a set of phases which determine the negotiation of an agreement with respect to violent political conflicts: “1. the pre-talks phase; 2. an era of secret talks; 3. the opening of multilateral talks; 4. negotiating to a settlement; 5. gaining endorsement; 6. implementing its provisions; and 7. the institutionalization of the new dispensation” (Guelke, 2008, p. 56).

As previously mentioned, the peace process involves several stages that are difficult to overcome in a short period of time, as there are many human or structural obstacles. The study carried out by Stedman (YEAR) in relation to the implementation of peace agreements in situations of civil war is relevant because it describes the necessary conditions to achieve successful peace agreements. According to Stedman, successful peace agreements are more difficult to achieve when: there are more than two conflicting parties involved; a political conflict involves a collapse in the power of the State’s governance and institutions; one of the parties is fighting for secession and independence from the other; there are leaders or parties that are opposed to the peace agreement (so-called 'spoilers'); neighbouring States are against the agreement.

Stedman’s investigation also mentioned the ways in which a peace agreement can be protected, such as: by overcoming the ‘spoilers’ described above; by proceeding with the demobilization of soldiers in order to reduce tension; by implementing foundations for long-term peacebuilding (such as disarmament); through police and judiciary reforms (Stedman, 2008).

2.7 Power-sharing

Jai Kwan Jung (2012) argues that the resolution of conflicts and the achievement of peace through peace agreements is more difficult in the context of civil wars than in interstate wars. According to the author, the resolution of conflicts and the subsequent duration of peace are influenced by how the conflict ends; for example, through a peace agreement, a declaration of truce, or a victory for one of the parties. The author concludes that the stability and duration of peace depends on these key factors (Jung, 2012).

According to Jai Kwan Jung, there is a greater possibility of a conflict resolution holding if agreement between parties is reached, because the parties have managed to reach a consensus, and are therefore at least partly satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations. However, it is important to note that a mediator's presence during the negotiations is crucial in order for the parties to achieve an agreement as peacefully as possible (Jung, 2012).

Regarding the outcome of a conflict through military victory by one of the parties, it is improbable that long-term peace will be established via this method, because the resolution of disagreements between the parties is only put on-hold, and not resolved in a way to satisfy all parties. Jung also describes how the creation of mechanisms, such as political institutions who aim to end conflict through peaceful means, are essential in the attainment of peace. In this context, the concept of power-sharing should be explored, because it is "the only feasible institutional option for ending civil wars through peace negotiations and for establishing durable peace and democracy in war-torn societies" (Lijphart, 1996 cited in Jung, 2012, p. 489).

Power-sharing starts from the idea that political institutions are the fundamental instrument for the cooperation between different groups in post-conflict societies, linking it thus to the promotion and establishment of peace: "power-sharing is an effective institutional option for resolving civil conflicts through peace negotiations, as it institutionally guarantees the security of warring groups" (Walter, 2002 cited in Jung, 2012, p. 489).

The power-sharing model is a complex concept that deserves attention due to its contributions to the area of conflict resolution. As such, it is relevant first to define power-sharing, and then to present the two main power-sharing theories, including their characteristics, norms, principles, and criticisms.

The term 'power-sharing' refers to the sharing of power between different (ethnic, religious, political) groups in the same territory. In certain instances, a country may endure a conflict due to problems or splits within its society. The reasons for these societal problems can be multiple, including religious, political, economic, or ethnic issues among others. In order to reach stable and lasting peace, it is necessary to overcome these differences and find harmony between the conflicting parties (Horowitz, 2014).

There are two theories upon which the concept of power-sharing is based: the consociational and centripetal models. A number of authors have written about both models, such as Arend Lijphart (1969), Joseph Lacey (2017), and Donald L. Horowitz, among others.

Authors such as John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (2004) outlined their position in relation to the power-sharing models, essentially in terms of Horowitz's approach (centripetal) presenting the

existing flaws of the model according to their point of view. At the same time, those authors defended the need to review and reformulate the model (centripetal model) so that it could be applied more efficiently and would produce positive results, so conflicts would be properly resolved.

Regarding the centripetal model, Donald L. Horowitz (2014) was one of its defenders. His study revealed that the transition to democracy, in post-conflict societies which are fragile and segmented into different groups, is extremely difficult as there is an imbalance between the population that constitutes the majority and the population that constitutes the minority, especially in conflicts triggered by ethnic and/or religious reasons. The difficulty lies mainly in finding a consensus that satisfies the interests and rights of both groups, which constitutes a complex challenge to overcome.

As Horowitz states in his study called *“The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict – Democracy in divided societies”*, “democracy is about inclusion and exclusion, about access to power, about the privileges that go with inclusion and the penalties that accompany exclusion” (Horowitz, 1993, p. 18). Furthermore, he presents the idea that in societies with a great ethnic division, it is extremely difficult to initiate democratization (in practice), whether they are facing conflict situations or post-conflict situations, and that “democracy can facilitate either majority rule and the exclusion of minorities or minority rule and the exclusion of majorities” (Horowitz, 1993, p. 20).

In another study from 2014, Horowitz reinforces the idea of how difficult is to find a governance model that is accepted by all ethnic groups that are part of an extremely divided society, as generally the minorities seek to obtain guarantees against the majority rule that goes against the consociational model. And the majorities, in turn, aspire to have majority rule, which refers to the centripetal model (Horowitz, 2014).

Through studying the work of Horowitz, it is possible to identify the two models adjacent to the concept of power sharing: the centripetal model and the consociational model. The consociational model was from the late 1960s, Arend Lijphart target its study. In 1977, the author defined the consociational model as a system that has the following features: “grand coalition government (between parties from different segments of society), segmental autonomy (in the cultural sector), proportionality (in the voting system and in public sector employment), and minority veto” (Wolff, 2010, p. 4).

Lijphart argued that all groups that constitute a society must have the right of being involved in the political decision-making process, participating directly or through representatives (Lijphart, 2012). Notwithstanding, the consociativists defend a parliamentary political system, “while acknowledging the merit and frequency of collective or rotating presidencies in existing functioning consociations, proportional (PR list) or proportional preferential (STV) electoral systems, decision making procedures

that require qualified and/or concurrent majorities, and have also advocated, at times, the application of the d'Hondt rule for the formation of executives" (Wolff, 2010, p. 8).

Lijphart was a defender of the consociational model. Over the years he has restructured his vision in relation to the model through his studies in 1968 and 1977. In the author's first research related to the model in 1968, he expanded upon the necessary mechanisms, at the institutional level, so that the fragmented societies in the post-conflict could enhance or progress towards a democratic society. According to the author, the achievement of a stable democracy is more feasible in situations in which there is an absence of differences (ethnic, religious, political, among others) between groups.

Later in 1977 Lijphart embraced all his ideas from his first work, putting them into a new book called *"Democracy in Plural Societies"* that offered an analysis of the consociational model and the idealisation of the most adequate democratic system.

According to Lijphart (1977), the consociational democracy model has four characteristics:

"the first and most important element is government by a grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society (...) the other three basic elements are (1) the mutual veto (...) (2) proportionality (...) and (3) a high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affairs" (Lijphart, 1977, p. 25).

Lijphart also determined that there is a set of elements or conditions that, if existing on a large scale, will increase the possibility of a stable democracy in a society with diverse groups. These elements or conditions are "a balance of power among the segments; a multi-party system with segmental parties; a small size of the country; some cross-cutting cleavages; overarching loyalties; a representative party-system; isolation of the segments from each other; and traditions of elite accommodation". (Schendelen, 1985, p. 153).

Lijphart's thesis focused on the model which argues that agreement between parties in a conflict must be established and must reflect the interests of both parties in order to reach a consensus. This would represent the ideal model of conflict resolution and democracy for countries with deep social, ethnic, religious and/or economic divisions. In effect, Lijphart argued that a democracy with an electoral system based on joined proportional representation, in conjunction with a decentralized system, is the best solution for fragile societies that have faced conflicts.

Although Lijphart initially argued that a 'consensus democracy' was the one which provided the most viable and best solutions for deeply divided post-conflict societies, later, in his 2001 study, he

analysed both the 'consensual democratic system' and the 'majority democratic system' and recognized the benefits of the centripetal model, which is based on the majority rule (Doorenspleet, 2013).

In summary, the power-sharing consociational model (developed by Lijphart) argues that the participation of all groups in the entire political process, as well as their representation, is the best way to end a conflict and associated violence. It also constitutes the best way for both groups to achieve their goals and ensure recognition of their interests (Wolff, 2005).

The consociational model advocates the establishment of a political system that provides and protects minorities' interests by ensuring them proportional participation in the government and the right of veto in policies of ethnicity that may affect those minorities. Due to this, those who defend the consociational model advocate in favour of a government coalition which represents both minorities and majorities (McGarry; O'Leary, 2004).

According to John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary:

"consociational democracies respect four organizational principles 1. Executive power-sharing (EPS). Each of the main communities share in executive power, in an executive chosen in accordance with the principles of representative government. 2. Autonomy or Self-government. Each enjoys some distinct measure of autonomy, particularly self-government in matters of cultural concern. 3. Proportionality. Each is represented proportionately in key public institutions and is a proportional beneficiary of public resources and expenditures. 4. Veto-rights. Each is able to prevent changes that adversely affect their vital interests" (McGarry; O'Leary, 2004, p. 44).

In contrast, the centripetal model is associated with Donald L. Horowitz. The government system proposed by the centripetal model is characterized by the idea of creating incentives in order to allow the formation of inter-ethnic coalitions and establish a regime based on majority rule (Horowitz, 2014). As John Gerring and Strom C. Thacker present in their work "*A Centripetal Theory of Democratic Governance*", a centripetal democracy depends on the following elements: "unitary (rather than federal) sovereignty, a parliamentary (rather than presidential) executive, and a closed-list PR electoral system (rather than a single-member district or preferential-vote system)" (Gerring; Thacker, 2008, p. 455).

Both models, centripetal and consociational, advocate a regime of power-sharing through the representation of ethnic groups in deeply divided societies. However, there is a contrast in relation to the ways in which they propose how a society should be governed. Consociationalists defend a combination of interests in post-electoral coalitions, while centripetalists aspire to a union of interests being formed in pre-election coalitions (Horowitz, 2014). As Horowitz explains in his study in 2014:

“Consociationalists aim at mandatory postelectoral governing coalitions of all ethnic antagonists who find their way into parliament through a proportional electoral system; centripetalists, by contrast, aim at voluntary preelectoral interethnic coalitions of moderates” (Horowitz, 2014, pp. 5-6).

For Horowitz, to achieve a democratic government, it is crucial that all ethnic groups be involved in the political decision-making process, especially at the executive level, in order to allow them to manage their own interests, mainly in relation to culture and education (Lijphart, 2004).

The consociational democracy model reflects the idea that democratic institutions work more effectively when they achieve a balanced combination between a broad inclusion group and the presence of a centralized authority.

However, according to Horowitz, there are certain issues which first must be resolved between different ethnic groups in order to achieve effective power-sharing governance. The author concludes that there are limitations with both models, such as: disagreements within political institutions; because there is no consensus, it is highly improbable that majorities and minorities will reach total agreement on all issues (Horowitz, 2014). Another limitation is the perception that everything which involves negotiations is carried out with ulterior motives by the parties involved in them, and therefore, in Horowitz's vision, the "negotiators (...) often they favour institutions prevailing in the most successful democracies, which generally do not suffer from the most severe ethnic problems, or models derived from an ex-colonial power" (Horowitz, 2014, p. 8).

Some of the problems mentioned by Horowitz refer to the degradation and modification of electoral institutions, while one other problem is associated with the centripetal model, because “when centripetal regimes degrade, minority disaffection can rise to dangerous heights” (Horowitz, 2014, p. 11). A possible limitation associated with the consociational model is that the formulation of an agreement, according to this power-sharing approach, enables the participation of all ethnic groups. For Horowitz, this limits and restricts the ability to make decisions, because all parties involved may not agree on certain matters, and this will prevent approval of any agreement, culminating in a “system frequently immobilized with respect to the very questions the agreement was made to settle” (Horowitz, 2014, p. 11).

Recently, a study was carried out by the professors Renske Doorenspleet and Huib Pellikaan on the different types of democracy. Their aim was to discover which system enables better governance. Their results reflect the investigation and study of several authors such as Lijphart (1999), Gerring and

Tacker (2008), among others, contrasting the elements identified by them as essential for achieving a successful democracy (Doorenspleet, 2013).

The professors concluded that, contrary to what Horowitz claimed, there is not a democratic model that can be implemented anywhere universally: the reality is true, and it is evident that the type of system needed depends on a range of variables which, combined, determine what is the best choice (Doorenspleet, 2013).

Despite the numerous studies in relation to democracy and power-sharing, the truth is that it is not possible to find a model that can be considered the most adequate, as there is no consensus between the researchers about its topic. Some researchers support one system, while others (researchers), support a different one. (Doorenspleet, 2013).

This difference of opinion among researchers shows that some consider that a majority democracy (present in the centripetal model) offers the necessary equilibrium for society to function; and that a democracy based on a proportional electoral system (advocated by the consociational model) offers imbalance. Others argue that proportional representation (in the consociational model) offers the best guarantee of peace and success with regard to peaceful coexistence between different ethnic groups in a given society (Doorenspleet, 2013).

Both Horowitz and Lijphart's concepts suffered criticisms. In relation to the consociational model, criticisms relate to an insufficient academic basis for the conceptual framework, as well as a lack of definitions for the key concepts in Lijphart's theory. Also, it can be claimed that there is significant complexity in putting all of the elements listed in the consociational model into practice (Doorenspleet, 2013).

In short, what distinguishes the two power-sharing models is that the consociationalists proposed the creation of a coalition of majorities and minorities through elections; on the other hand, centripetalists aimed to create an interethnic coalition, through election, but with the ultimate aim of establishing an electoral regime based on the majority rule (Horowitz, 2014).

In effect, both power-sharing models share the same purpose: to divide power among different ethnic groups. However, they both have different mechanisms to achieve this purpose.

Although there is a consensus between the authors of the two models that the electoral system process is a crucial post-conflict element in an ethnically divided society, they disagree on the type of electoral system that best suits a society. The choice of electoral system depends on the type of disagreements and factions present within the society, and on its social structure. That is, contrary to

Horowitz's idea that the democracy of power-sharing is a "one size fits all" model, it is relevant to consider other aspects such as social, economic, and ethnic, among others. (Horowitz, 2005 cited in Lijphart, 2004)

As previously mentioned, the theoretical approach of the centripetal democracy is based on the majority rule process; that is, the candidate who gets the most votes wins. This means that candidates must attract the support of a large part of the population, including different ethnic groups (Horowitz, 1993 cited in Sumino, 2012). The theory of a consociational democracy is based on proportional representation in the electoral system, which provides for the inclusion of all ethnic minorities, and promotes interethnic cooperation.

In summary, the concept of power-sharing is very complex, both in its approach and conception, as there are different opinions about the best way to achieve a stable democracy which is accepted by the different groups present in the population. Peace and democracy are inseparable and cannot function without each other for an extended period of time: in the cases of countries which have been through civil conflicts, power-sharing is seen as the most effective way to overcome disputes and opposition between different ethnic groups and to achieve peace.

What can be seen when discussing the concept of power-sharing is that the type of democracy presented and defended in the consociational model "combines a fragmented political culture with coalescent elite behaviour, while majoritarian democratic systems are characterized by a homogeneous political culture with competitive elite behaviour" (Lijphart, 1968 cited in Doorenspleet, 2013, pp. 5-6).

2.8 Summary of the literature review

The first topic is about conflict: its definition, the evolution of conflict studies and conflict resolution tools. The second topic is related to peace. It explains what peace is, the types of peace, peacekeeping processes and the 'triangle of violence'. Furthermore, the third concept discusses the concept of security, followed by the peacebuilding process through agreements in the fourth topic. The fifth and final topic is about power-sharing theories – 'consociationalism' and 'centripetalism' developed by Donald Horowitz and Arend Lijphart respectively.

3 Research Methodology

3.1 Introduction

Research methods are tools for collecting, analyzing, and interpreting research information. A variety of purposes can be served by such tools, and their characteristics can be qualitative or quantitative. The research method to be used depends on the type of study that is being conducted.

Essentially, the research method describes how the researcher performs different activities during the investigation. It is crucial to select an appropriate research method because the method that is employed will have a major influence on the eventual outcome of the study and will generally determine whether the study can be deemed successful or of educational value. The reliability and validity of research is determined by the method by which it is performed.

3.2 Philosophies

Because The Troubles were very violent and the conflict was extreme and based on sectarianism and national opposition (Ireland and the United Kingdom), it was very important to find and rely on unbiased data and information from respected academics, historians, journalists, and other trustworthy sources for this work. Therefore, this work will aim to be completely unbiased and rely on sources of information that can be trusted.

3.3 Approaches

Regarding research methods, approaches refer to the discussion of choices available to researchers in relation to being deductive and/or inductive in how they conduct their studies.

An inductive approach to this work has been chosen because the information was gathered through literature review (secondary research). After this, strong patterns and themes in the data were searched for and identified to enable conclusions.

3.4 Strategies

This section refers to the strategies available to researchers and the specific strategy chosen in relation to this research.

For this work, the strategy used is a qualitative research method that incorporates a secondary research process to collect information. The qualitative aspect of the research refers to the collection and

studying of relevant literature and other sources of information relevant to this study with the intention to provide enough information for the development of the research topic in question.

3.5 Choices

In this section, the specific choice for this work is explicitly stated. As previously mentioned, for this study a qualitative method is being used, as a literature review will be carried out to collect information that is relevant to this work.

3.6 Time horizon

Cross-sectional research studies involve the observation of variables at a particular point in time. They are cheaper than longitudinal studies and less time-consuming also. For this reason, a cross-sectional research method is employed for this work, because the nature of the work and the deadlines involved do not facilitate a longitudinal study, which involves the study of the same data or variables repeatedly over a prolonged period of time, usually years. It is also descriptive in nature, because it describes outcomes which already occurred in Northern Ireland and reflects on them through the use of power-sharing model theories. It will also discuss how effective they were when applied to The Troubles.

However, it is important to mention that there are elements of longitudinal studies present in this work, because it is possible to observe and discuss changes in the relationships of the parties in the Northern Ireland conflict, as the period being analysed is in the past (the 1960s-1998). One of the main aims is to use some of the key learnings from the conflict to explain how and why a power-sharing model can be employed to resolve religious/internal conflicts.

3.7 Research limitations

One limitation of using a secondary research method (in this case a literature review) is that it is necessary to use information that is already available; therefore, there may not be enough information available to answer the research question. As a result, it may become necessary to also use primary research methods in order to generate more information to be used along with the information already gathered.

4. Case study - Conflict in Northern Ireland (The Troubles)

4.1 Introduction

This section will explore the conflict that took place in Northern Ireland, known as 'The Troubles' from 1968 to 1998. The fundamental points necessary to understand the difficulties in reaching a peace agreement between the parties during the Troubles will be explained, and the underlying issues related to the conflict will be expanded upon.

When considering the Troubles, it is necessary to understand the distinction between 'Unionists' and 'Nationalists'. Unionists were those who supported Northern Ireland's union with Great Britain, while nationalists were those who supported the aim of unifying the island of Ireland (Gillespie, 2017).

Both Unionists and Nationalists had distinct armed forces who fought for their causes and goals. The Loyalists represented the Unionists in the quest for a Northern Ireland that would remain united with the United Kingdom, while the Republicans were associated with Nationalists in the fight for the independence of the Northern Irish territory from the United Kingdom and the future unification of the island of Ireland.

Although this work focuses on the Troubles from 1968 onwards, it is important to briefly discuss the Irish War of Independence that took place between 1919-1921, because the reasons that gave rise to both conflicts (the Troubles and the Irish War of Independence) overlap.

4.2 The War of Independency (1919-1921)

From 1916-1921 relations between Unionists and Nationalists regarding the future of Northern Ireland were very agitated, as the territory was under British political control. Invasions into Irish territory by England began around the 12th century; as its expansion increased, so did English control over Irish land, especially Northern Ireland. In 1534, the Act of Supremacy was passed in the Parliament of Ireland, which declared King Henry II the supreme head of the Church of Ireland, and in 1541, he officially became the King of Ireland (Madden, F.J.M., 2010).

Over centuries, England's hold over Irish territory became more solid. The majority of the Irish population was Catholic, and for this reason, it was persecuted by the more powerful, Protestant English (Madden, F.J.M., 2010).

The expansion of British power into Irish territory gave rise, on one hand, to a change in the devotion of part of the Irish population to Protestantism and an allegiance to England. On the other hand,

it gave rise to a rejection of England by the Catholic population, who were determined for the English to leave Ireland and give back both its religious and political independence.

Due to the increase in the English presence in Ireland, and as a result of the strong opposition from the Catholic community, the English began to impose even more limitations on Irish Catholics, forbidding them, for example, “to receive an education, enter a profession, vote, hold public office, practice their religion, attend Catholic worship, engage in trade or commerce, purchase land, lease land, receive a gift of land, or inherit land from a Protestant” (Amina, 2010, p. 7).

In the early 1900’s, land tenure was an important issue, as only those who owned lands were entitled to vote, and “about 5,000 Protestant families owned 95% of Irish land” (Amina, 2010, p. 9). This explains why the Catholic community couldn’t vote and had no representation at a political level and was naturally one of the main reasons for their discontent.

As Madden (2010) states, “the Catholic population lost out on huge amounts of land and was excluded from living in towns or from involvement in the administration of the Island. Ireland’s wealth and political power had been lost to a new system of rulers who were Protestant in faith and English in attitude” (Madden, 2010, p. 38).

Religious opposition between Protestants and Catholics in the 17th century (XVII) gave rise to a deep division in Ireland. Moreover, in 1801 the animosity and aversion between the communities was strengthened with the Act of Union, which declared the joining of Ireland to Great Britain, and created the United Kingdom, as it came to be recognized. With that, Ireland started to be governed from London at Westminster through a united Parliament (Macúchová and Michelčíková, 2011).

Until the Act of Union, Ireland’s parliament had always been in Dublin. By ending Ireland’s political representation in Dublin, the United Kingdom also intended to use Ireland as an example to all British colonies that sought independence from its control (Amina, 2010).

Discontent among the Catholic community grew, not only because of their differentiation in terms of social rights, since they were deprived of the opportunity to exercise public functions; but also in political terms, leading to the growth of nationalist movements between the 19th and 20th centuries. Nationalists intended to end British domain in Ireland and advocated independence for the entire island of Ireland, going directly against the Protestant population who defended Ireland’s union with the United Kingdom (Macúchová and Michelčíková, 2011).

The war between Loyalist (Protestant) and Republican (Catholic) forces only came to an end in 1920, with an Act that divided the Irish territory into north and south, with two separate parliaments: one in Belfast, representing the 6 counties that would remain united with the British government; and another

in Dublin, representing the remaining 26 counties of independent Ireland (Madden, 2010). On 6th December 1921, the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed between representatives of the British government and representatives of the first Irish parliament, celebrating the formation of the Irish Independent State, thus recognizing its independence (Madden, 2010).

In short, the British government, with the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921, granted the Irish independence in matters of internal affairs and foreign policy, but imposed the condition on Ireland to swear allegiance to the British crown, which gave rise to two opposing reactions from Nationalists: those who were opposed to the agreement and those who were in favour of it (Macúchová and Michelčíková, 2011). Furthermore, the treaty introduced the opt-out clause for Northern Ireland, granting the possibility of a future union with the rest of Ireland, if that would be the will of the majority of the Northern Irish population (Macúchová and Michelčíková, 2011).

4.3 The Troubles (1968 – 1998)

The Irish war of independence (1919 – 1921) marked a deeply troubled period in Irish history. This conflict is often seen as a religious conflict due to the two main opposition communities at that time in Northern Ireland: Catholics and Protestants. The differences between the communities gave rise to the creation of political parties to represent their respective interests. However, the war for independence in Ireland was much more than just a religious conflict; it was also a political confrontation that exposed two sides.

On one hand the Unionists who, despite being composed mainly of Protestants, represented more than that - they represented those who wished to remain part of the United Kingdom. On the other hand were the Nationalists, composed of Catholics who defended the right for greater political autonomy for Ireland, an effective separation from the United Kingdom, and consequent Irish unification. These were the main reasons that triggered Ireland's War of Independence (1919), but also triggered the 1968 conflict in Northern Ireland, known as the Troubles. Therefore, it is relevant to consider the Troubles not only as a religious conflict, but also as a political conflict, because it was a clash between political parties that, while representing the dichotomy between existing communities' religious beliefs (Catholics and Protestants), also represented uncertainty and division regarding Ireland's political future.

The territorial division which was consolidated in 1921 highlighted structural weaknesses in Northern Ireland that would serve as fuel for the Troubles in 1968 (Feeney, 2004). With the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921, the Republic of Ireland consented to not interfere in the internal affairs of the six counties

in North Ireland, which were under the direct control of Westminster, but with local government in Stormont in Belfast (Feeney, 2004).

From 1921, the administration of all matters relating to Northern Ireland were dealt with in the local Northern Ireland Parliament in Stormont, which was made up of Unionists; Nationalists had no representation. Despite significant changes that occurred around 1960, mainly in the area of education, the system was still unequal in terms of rights and opportunities for the Catholic population when compared with the Protestant population. To protest against the unfair system, members of the Catholic Nationalist population started movements to request the same political and social rights as Protestants (Prince, 2007).

One of the main factors behind the beginning of a civil rights movement in Northern Ireland was the change in political system based on proportional representation. The system was introduced during the local elections with the Irish Government Act of 1920, in order to protect minorities. However, in 1922, the approval of the Local Government Act changed the voting system, with the abolition of the principle of proportional representation in the Irish Parliament of Northern Ireland, and the consequent introduction of the voting system known as 'First Past the Post' (O'Brien, 2010).

The First Past the Post (FPTP) voting system, which was being used in Westminster, operated as follows: "The candidate with the most votes in each constituency wins and becomes the MP (member of Parliament) for that seat. All other votes are disregarded" (The Telegraph, 2019).

The FPTP system ended up accentuating the differences in terms of political rights between Catholic and Protestant communities as Catholics had no representation in the Northern Irish Parliament.

Furthermore, from 1921 onwards, with the intention of preventing Catholics from winning seats in the Stormont Parliament, unionists began to use "*gerrymandering* to redraw voting districts, ensuring a winning Protestant vote. For example, Stormont divided Londonderry into three wards..." (McKaughan, 2018, p. 3).

As Brian Feeney states: "Northern Ireland had twelve seats at Westminster: Unionists held them all" (Feeney, 2004, p. 12).

Around 1960, Northern Ireland was a territory inhabited by a population of 60% Protestants and 40% Catholics (Hayes, 2007, p. 98). From 1920 onwards, Northern Ireland "was administered by a miniature government, complete with prime minister and Cabinet. There was a legislature made up of a fifty-two-member Commons and a smaller, powerless Senate" (Feeney, 2004, p. 80). However, proportional representation was abolished with the approval of the Act of Union, leaving all political

power in the hands of the Unionists, and excluding Nationalists who represented the Catholic community (Feeney, 2004).

Furthermore, “the Northern Irish state did not operate on modern democratic principles of one vote per person, instead using a number of conditions on votes in order to further disenfranchise Catholics. Voting in local governments was open only to ratepayers and their spouses” (Fenton, 2018, p.22).

As Brian Feeney states, there was not a single Catholic member in the cabinet before 1969 (Feeney, 2004). By that time, there was a discriminatory system in Northern Ireland with an administration purely controlled by Unionists and Protestants (Fenton, 2018). Unionists, in fact, controlled the entire economic, political, and social structures of Northern Ireland: they worked in the majority of industrial and public office jobs, because a person could only hold such positions if they had sworn allegiance to the Crown – something which was unthinkable to the vast majority of Nationalists. The system in Northern Ireland was deeply divided between Protestants, who held all public office positions, and Nationalists who were unable to perform such functions (Feeney, 2004).

Discrimination against the Catholic community was most visible in relation to the voting system and housing. Although these problems may not appear to be related on the surface, housing directly influenced voting rights at that time in Northern Ireland as Protestants, to keep their political majority, refused to build public housing outside most Catholic districts (...). If more Catholics moved to Protestant districts through public allocations, then Catholics could gain more seats on the Council or in Stormont – Protestants wanted to avoid that (McKaughan, 2018, p. 2).

In the mid-1960s, the Catholic community was able to avail of free education due to the establishment of a free education system provided by the United Kingdom. Living in a society in which the administrative domain was under the control of the Protestant community, the Catholic community, which was now better organised (instructed), began to persistently demand the same rights as the Unionists, with the aim to have better ‘positions’ in society, including the possibility to work in public service areas and to have access to an allocation of public housing (Feeney, 2004).

When Terence O'Neill was elected as the Prime Minister of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) in 1963, he began to implement reforms in favour of the Catholic minority, who had become more vocal in their protestations. His goal was to reform the economy and to improve the relationship between Unionists and Nationalists, and also to create a better relationship with the Government of Dublin, in order to alleviate Nationalists' feelings of injustice towards the political system of Northern Ireland (Feeney, 2004). However, the reforms implemented by O'Neill caused discontent among Unionists such

as Ian Paisley, who was the leader of the DUP (Democratic Unionist Party), as well as members of O'Neill's own party, the UUP, such as William Craig and Brian Faulkner (Feeney, 2004).

Consequently, a wave of dissatisfaction came both inside and outside the UUP (Ulster Unionist Party). A campaign led by Brian Faulkner started with the aim to remove O'Neill from the UUP. The protests, mostly within the Unionist party, were increasing, especially after Terence O'Neill's meeting with the President of the Republic of Ireland, Taoiseach Sean Lemass, who also fought in the IRA (Irish Republican Army) in the War of Independence in 1919-21 (Feeney, 2004).

Tension between O'Neill and members of his UUP party, with other Unionist parties, and even with Nationalists, increased in 1966 on the eve of the Celebration of 50 years after the *Easter Rising*. This date was marked by a set of riots that resulted in the deaths of two Catholics in a "sequence of a series of gun attacks by the UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force - a paramilitary group that adopted the name of the 1912 organization). These deaths are seen by some authors as marking the first shots in what would become known as 'the Troubles'" (Madden, 2010, p. 218). Subsequently, O'Neill abolished the UVF and, from then, the support for his actions progressively decreased, both within his party as well as in his cabinet (Madden, 2010).

O'Neill not only had to deal with the negative feedback from his party and community, but also had to carry out the reforms that he proposed to run. The dissatisfaction felt by members of the UUP towards O'Neill's reforms led to them deciding that his removal from the party was essential to guarantee the maintenance of Unionist control in the Stormont Parliament.

In 1969, a wave of bombings took place in Belfast: The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was blamed for these events. In response to the attacks, O'Neill deployed a special force to Belfast.

However, later it was discovered that those responsible for the bombings had actually been the UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force). With this attack, the UVF intended to prevent the realization and consolidation of the reform plan proposed by O'Neill, defending the idea by declaring that the IRA posed a threat to Northern Ireland by undermining its entire political and social structure. In fact, this whole scheme orchestrated by the Unionists worked, as a few months later O'Neill resigned (Feeney, 2004).

From 1921 until the mid-1960s, the fight to gain Catholic representation in the Parliament in Stormont was in the hands of the Nationalist party. However, this party "failed to organize properly, frequently abstained from the Stormont parliament and restricted its activities to areas where it could reliably command a majority". (Mitchell, 2015, p. 86). In this sense, there were obstacles from all fronts, both by the Catholic community as well as by the Republican forces, as they seemed more concerned with

efforts to reunify the island of Ireland than with helping the community to guarantee their political and social rights. (Mitchell, 2015).

The National Democratic Party (NDP) emerged in 1965. Its principles were founded on “belief in constructive political action, an efficient political organization and open membership” (McAllister, 1975, p. 354). Moreover, in 1970 the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) was created by a group of members of the Stormont Parliament who were active in Catholic civil rights campaigns (Mitchell, 2015).

In order to obtain the same civil rights as Protestants, the Nationalists began to stage marches. The first Nationalist march was planned for August 1968, with the aim of traveling from Coalisland to Dungannon, having been sponsored by the “*Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association*” (NICRA) (Prince, 2007, p. 27). The NICRA was known for carrying out campaigns for the protection of civil rights. They were “the most important group within the civil rights movement and it initiated the events that led to the creation of a mass movement” (Purdie, 1990, p. 121) and had the motto: “one man, one vote” (O’Hagan, 2018)

The march in August 1968 was supposed to be peaceful, but it ended up in a confrontation when the *Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)* police force intervened in order to stop it from continuing its course (Prince, 2007). This intervention by the *RUC* resulted in marchers getting injured and received a lot of attention on radio and television, which concerned the British government due to the negative affect that it would have on its public image (Hopkinson, 2014).

The purpose of the march was to form a coalition between Unionists and Nationalists in the Stormont Government to guarantee the same opportunities for the two groups in terms of civil rights. Although, some civil rights activists believed that the ultimate goal of Nationalists was not exactly the end of the discriminatory system, but to end the division of the Irish territory and later achieve the re-unification of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (Prince, 2007).

In 1969, both the Sinn Féin political party and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) suffered an internal division that gave rise to the *Provisional Sinn Féin* and to the *Provisional IRA* - as a result of the IRA's strong use of force and Sinn Féin's involvement in the armed fighting (Mitchell, 2015). The “split was a result of deepening insecurity in the North, with the Northern IRA becoming increasingly militant in the face of loyalist attacks on the Catholic community and unionist indifference to Catholic grievances” (Mitchell, 2015, p. 110).

The atrocities committed by Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups were accumulating - in September 1970 “the IRA and UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force) had detonated one hundred explosions since the start of the year. Twenty-one people had been killed, among them constables Samuel Donaldson and

Robert Millar near Crossmaglen, the first RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary) men the IRA killed in the Troubles” (Feeney, 2004, p. 35).

Due to the scale of the violence that kept progressing from both sides, the British government began to consider abolishing the government of Stormont. With this pressure in-mind, when Brian Faulkner became the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland in 1971, his primary objective was to end the violence being exerted by both Loyalist and Republican forces in the streets (Feeney, 2004).

The level of violence being inflicted by the paramilitary groups was very high at the turn of the decade. “In 1970 twenty-nine people were killed; in 1971, (...) 180 died, of whom ninety-four were civilians”. (Feeney, 2004, p. 38). In response to the increase in violence, the Prime Minister Brian Faulkner, who was a Unionist, implemented a policy of internment in 1971. The internment policy consisted of the imprisonment, without trial, of any individual who was suspected of being involved in causing violence. The logic behind this decision was that it would help to reduce the level of violence (Feeney, 2004).

However, the level of violence between Loyalist and Republican forces, the IRA (Irish Republican Army) the UVF and the British armed forces (the RUC) and the “*B Specials*”, continued to rise, reaching a new level with the attack known as *Bloody Sunday* on 30th January 1972. In this atrocity, “13 people were shot dead by the British army while taking part in a peaceful civil rights march against the policy of internment in a predominantly Catholic area of Derry city, Northern Ireland” (Conway, 2003, p.3). As a result, “London had to take responsibility for security in the North, particularly as more and more British troops poured in to deal with the surge in violence which the killings in Derry had provoked” (Feeney, 2004, p. 39).

Following the incident, Faulkner reinforced security measures, such as the deployment of military forces to take back the so-called banned ‘zones’ (Barton; Roche, 2009). These banned ‘zones’ were Catholic areas in which the British Armed Forces and the RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary) could not operate because they were controlled by the IRA (Gillespie, 2017).

Despite the reinforcement of security measures by Faulkner in Northern Ireland, the measures were not enough to contain the levels violence. On 24th March 1972, the British Prime Minister Ted Heath met Faulkner to inform him of his decision to transfer Northern Ireland’s security policy to Westminster, with a subsequent transfer of direct control for security of Northern Ireland from Stormont to Westminster. This decision was not welcomed by unionists, who felt betrayed by the UK government, as it had removed their political power (Feeney, 2004). Heath’s decision did not have a major effect on the dispute, as tensions and violence continued to escalate.

In 1973, the first agreement between the British and Irish government was proposed in Sunningdale, in an attempt “to form a cross-community coalition government to achieve political stability in the divided province” (Morisi, 2006, p. 1). The Sunningdale agreement, however, was not successful. This will be expanded up in section 5.1.

In 1976, the internment policy was revoked by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Merlyn Rees. With this, he withdrew the special status of political prisoners; this prevented imprisonment by the authorities of members of paramilitary groups without trial. However, this decision caused revolt among current republican prisoners, because it meant that they would suffer a loss of privileges which they currently had, such as the “right to wear civilian clothes, freedom from prison work, open communication amongst prisoners, shorter sentences, and unrestricted special privileges such as visits” (McKaughan, 2018, p. 29). This action triggered multiple protests by the prisoners, which became known as ‘Hunger Strikes’. One protest took place in October 1980, and the other in March 1981, which ended in October of the same year as the republican prisoners decided to end the hunger strikes (McKaughan, 2018).

The Hunger Strikes marked a significant period in the change of the relationship between the British and the Irish governments, because of the way the UK government handled the problem. Ten prisoners died while imprisoned, ruining any chance of a resolution being reached (O’Kane, 2007). With the end of the hunger strikes, the IRA (Irish Republican Army) and the Sinn Féin party gained more support. Sinn Féin emerged as a political force in Northern Ireland at this time, threatening the SDLP’s (Social Democratic and Labour Party) dominance (O’Kane, 2007).

Increased support for Sinn Féin was seen as worrying by the UK government and unionists in Northern Ireland, because Sinn Féin had a strong connection with the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), which “In response to the Hunger Strikes (...) targeted law enforcement and British military personnel in their various assassination and bombing campaigns, killing at least 60 people during the Hunger Strikes alone”. (McKaughan, 2018, p. 31).

The PIRA was created in 1969 as a result of a division within the IRA:

“elements in the IRA were unhappy with the movement’s increasing emphasis on leftist politics at the expense of armed action. (...) the split was a result of deepening insecurity in the North, with the Northern IRA becoming increasingly militant in the face of loyalist attacks on the catholic community and unionist indifference to catholic grievances” (Mitchell, 2015, p.110).

The support offered to Sinn Féin was even more evident in the 1983 Northern Ireland elections, when it achieved over 13% of votes, against 17.9% for the SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party). This prompted the British and Irish governments to reach a new peace agreement (McKaughan, 2018).

The latest round of negotiations between both governments resulted in the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. This agreement defined the principles that had to be established in Northern Ireland to end the conflict. However, this agreement proved not to be successful either, as Nationalists felt that it did not go far enough to address the imbalance of power in Northern Ireland, as it was unable to bring about a government with power shared between Unionists and Nationalists. Furthermore, in accordance with the SDLP's view, the agreement did not take into account the 'Irish dimension', meaning closer relations between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (Morisi, 2006).

The Anglo-Irish Agreement didn't work, and the wave of violence continued to grow, causing both unionist and nationalist casualties. It was only in 1996 that new negotiations between the two governments started again, with the participation of all the Nationalist and Unionist parties to achieve a real agreement that would benefit both parties involved in the conflict. This resulted in the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 (Dorney, 2015).

After thirty years of conflict and approximately two years of negotiations, the conflict finally came to an end, as a peace agreement with a government system based on a power-sharing model between Nationalists and Unionists was achieved.

This political agreement was carried out through cooperation between the British and Irish governments, and Northern Ireland's political parties, namely: Sinn Féin, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), and the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP), who had generally accepted that they would have to unite in a condemnation of violence from both sides in order to end the conflict and lay the foundations for peace in Northern Ireland (Mitchell, 2015).

5 - Peace process in Northern Ireland until the Good Friday Agreement in 1998

This section will analyse the entire peace process in Northern Ireland, from the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement, which marked the first attempt to end the conflict, until the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, which managed to achieve an agreement between the opposition parties.

The agreements will be reviewed, with a description of the parties involved in each of them, their ambitions and agendas, as well as the causes of failure of some of the agreements.

In effect, the main goal of this section is to see if the Good Friday agreement managed to resolve the issues inherent in the conflict in Northern Ireland, and how all the existing obstacles and disagreements were overcome to reach the agreement.

The following question will also be addressed: considering that the previous two agreements failed, what made the Good Friday Agreement unique and distinct from the other agreements?

The table below presents the principles proposed and established in each peace agreement during the Troubles in Northern Ireland.

AGREEMENTS	PRINCIPLES
Sunningdale Agreement, 1973	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Executive Power-Sharing • Council of Ireland • Council of Ministers and Consultative Assembly • Principle of consent
Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Principle of consent • Intergovernmental conference • Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council
Good Friday Agreement, 1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Principle of Consent • New power-sharing Assembly in Northern Ireland • North/South Ministerial Council • British-Irish Council • Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference

5.1. Sunningdale Agreement of 1973

After years of conflict and violence between Unionists and Nationalists that spread terror, with bombings and attacks that killed dozens of civilians, the British and Irish governments were aware of the necessity to end the conflict and to establish a form of co-operation with each other in order to build peace in Northern Ireland. (Mitchell, 2015). This led to The Sunningdale Agreement in 1973, which aimed to end the conflict.

Around 1973, the confrontation between Nationalists and Unionists reached a level of excessive violence, making it imperative for the British and Irish governments to act to end the wave of violence

between the Loyalist and Republican forces. (McKaughan, 2018). The first initiative to solve the conflict was proposed in October 1972 by Northern Ireland's Secretary of State, William Whitelaw, who drafted and delivered to the British government a document called *The Future of Northern Ireland: A Paper for Discussion (Green Paper; 1972)*. In the document, he exposed the problems that needed to be solved, and proposed solutions for those problems through the establishment of a government in Northern Ireland based on power-sharing, which would hopefully lead to a lasting peace (Frank, 2017).

The options outlined in the 'Green Paper' were: "integration; a purely executive authority (council); a limited law-making body (convention); a return to meaningful devolution in the form of a powerful legislature and executive" (McDaid, 2013, pp. 45-46). Furthermore, the document suggested the creation of an elected Assembly that would replace the Northern Ireland Parliament. The 'Green Paper' proposed:

"two significant principles which would form the core strategies delineated of the double-sided British structural policy in the years ahead. First, a power-sharing formula must be incorporated in any new structure to replace the Unionists' cherished Westminster-style, simple majority rule. Secondly, the Green Paper made explicit the importance of the Republic of Ireland as a player in the game, and coined the phrase 'Irish dimension'". (Bloomfield, 1997, pp. 27-28).

After being debated in the Parliament at Westminster and analysed by the British and Northern Irish politicians, the Green Paper was released in March 1973 by William Whitelaw under the name of *White Paper - Northern Ireland Constitutional proposals*. The document proposed the creation of the following structure:

"The power-sharing formula comprised an elected unicameral Assembly which would organise its own structures (an executive and a committee-based legislature) and then approach the Secretary of State, who would hand over executive and legislature powers if convinced that a power-sharing framework was in place to protect the involvement of Catholic representatives in the process" (Bloomfield, 1997, pp. 28-29).

In effect, the White Paper proposed "the creation of a new law-making assembly. This would be elected through proportional representation, a fairer system of election long since abandoned by the old regime" (Madden, 2010, p. 243).

In addition, the White Paper also established two conditions as essential for the success of the proposal. One of them was power-sharing between the Catholic and the Protestant communities; the

other was recognition of the 'Irish Dimension', through the involvement of the Republic of Ireland in certain Northern Irish subjects. Its participation would take place at the Council of Ireland, to be created in the future (Madden, 2010).

The guidelines suggested in the two documents, the 'Green Paper' and the 'White Paper', reflected the importance and the urgency of establishing joint governance between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom for the benefit of Northern Ireland, to facilitate an end to the conflict and to establish a peace agreement (Hennessey, 2015). However, these recommendations caused different opinions, especially among Unionists, because some parties were opposed to the idea of power-sharing. This opposition became evident in the elections for the Assembly. The following were the results of those elections:

<i>Party</i>	<i>Percentage of vote</i>	<i>Number of seats</i>
Pro-White Paper UUP	29.3	24
SDLP	22.1	19
APNI	9.2	8
NILP	2.6	1
Total pro-White Paper	63.2	52
Anti-White Paper UUP	8.5	8
DUP	10.8	8
VUPP	10.5	7
West Belfast Loyalists	2.3	3
Total anti-White Paper	32.1	26

Dixon, 2008, p. 131

From analysis of the table above, the division between those who supported a power-sharing government system and those who were opposed is clear. White Paper supporters won most of the seats in the Assembly, but the remaining seats were claimed mainly by Unionists opposed to it.

Despite the Unionists' opposition, the White Paper was approved by the SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party), APNI (Alliance), and NILP (Northern Ireland Labour Party), and some UUP (Ulster Unionist Party) members, who supported Brian Faulkner, the former Unionist prime minister of Northern Ireland; the UUP also had members who won seats but who were against the approval of the White Paper (McKaughan, 2018).

The division within the UUP was because some members were against the power-sharing model and the creation of the Council of Ireland, while other members agreed with the proposals. The divergence


of opinions inside the party led to its separation, with the consequent creation of the Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party (VUPP) (Dixon, 2011).

On the other hand, the Nationalist political parties were largely satisfied with the proposals in the White Paper, specifically with the creation of the two institutions: the power-sharing Consultative Assembly and the Council of Ireland, both of which would represent the interests and rights of Catholic citizens, guaranteeing them some power and the right to vote.

Despite the approval of the White Paper, there was still a large percentage of Unionists against the implementation of the power-sharing model. This impacted the prospects for success of the proposed governance model.

After five months of negotiations, Whitelaw “convinced rival unionist and nationalist leaders, such as former Unionist Prime Minister Brian Faulkner and SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party) negotiator John Hume, to set aside irreconcilable differences and form a power-sharing executive at Stormont” (LSE, 2011)

In November 1973, the power-sharing Executive was formed, composed as seen below:



At the end of 1973 (6th-9th December), the Sunningdale Conference took place. The main aims of the conference were: (i) to make a decision in relation to the creation of the Council of Ireland and (ii) to establish an agreement between the parties.

The Sunningdale Conference brought together Northern Ireland's State Secretary Francis Pym (who had replaced Whitelaw), the respective Prime Ministers at the time: Liam Cosgrave (the Taoiseach of Ireland), and Sir Edward Heath (from the United Kingdom), as well as the leaders of the political parties: SDLP - Gerry Fitt; UUP - Brian Faulkner; and APNI (Alliance Party of Northern Ireland) - Oliver Napier. Some members of the remaining political parties, namely members of the UUP, DUP (Democratic Unionist Party) and Vanguard (VUPP), who were against the approval of the White Paper, more precisely against the idea of a government based on power-sharing, were excluded from the Conference by the British government, in order to avoid any interruption in the negotiation process (McKaughan, 2018).

At the Sunningdale Conference, both the British and Irish governments, as well as the political parties involved in the new Executive, defined the following principles to be introduced into the agreement:

- 1. Principle of Consent** - that the Northern Ireland statute must remain intact and that should only be changed by decision of the majority of the country's population.
- 2. The creation of the Council of Ireland** - composed of fourteen members (seven from the Republic of Ireland and seven from Northern Ireland).

2.1 Establishment of the Council of Ministers – “with executive and harmonising function and a consultative role (...) would act by unanimity, and would comprise a core of seven members of the Irish Government and an equal number of members of the Northern Ireland Executive with provision for the participation of other non-voting members of the Irish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive or Administration when matters within their departmental competence were discussed” (Sunningdale Agreement, 1973 cited in Elliot, 2007, p. 223-24).

2.2 Creation of a Consultative Assembly - “with advisory and review functions (...) would consist of 60 members, 30 members from Dáil Éireann, chosen by the Dáil on the basis of proportional representation by the single transferable vote, and 30 members from the Northern Ireland Assembly chosen by that Assembly and also on that basis” (Sunningdale Agreement, 1973 cited in Elliot, 2007, p. 223).

- 3. Executive based on the power-sharing model.**

Against the wishes of the DUP (Democratic Unionist Party), and of its party leader Ian Paisley, and of some UUP members, the Sunningdale Agreement was signed in December 1973 between the British and Irish government, establishing the first step towards achieving a Government based on the power-sharing model between Unionists and Nationalists, and with an Executive as part of the Government from January 1974, after approximately two years of Direct Rule. The agreement would represent the interests of both Nationalists and Unionists (Mandelson, 2007).

The Sunningdale Agreement marks an important point in Irish history, as it represents the first attempt of an agreement between Unionists and Nationalists, based on a 'joint' form of governance – the power-sharing model. Although the parties agreed on the principles defined in the Sunningdale Agreement, and had effectively signed the document, Faulkner and the SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party) members perceived the Agreement differently, and had given different meanings to some of its principles (Madden, 2010).

The misunderstanding of the principles of the Sunningdale Agreement by Faulkner and the SDLP members, plus the creation of the *United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC)*, led to the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement. It had failed to respond to the expectations of all parties and ensure that the agendas and interests of each of the parties involved in the conflict were satisfied.

On one hand, the United Kingdom and the Unionists (the majority of the population in Northern Ireland) wanted Northern Ireland to remain under British control. On the other hand, the Nationalists wanted to obtain the same rights as the Unionists, to be represented in the government and to be able to vote on decisions that would concern them. The Agreement tried to reconcile the claims of each of the parties through its principles, with the possibility that the Agreement could be changed in accordance with the wishes of the majority of Northern Ireland's population. The Agreement also proposed the creation of the power-sharing Executive, the Council of Ireland and the Assembly of Northern Ireland, to ensure that the interests of Nationalists would be considered (McKaughan, 2018, p. 20).

However, despite the idea of a power-sharing government (which proposed a more inclusive approach) and the introduction of the principle of consent, Unionists especially were not receptive to the idea, present in the Agreement, of a partnership between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, considering that the proposal of a new Executive (based on power-sharing) and the creation of the Council of Ireland could be the first step in the reunification of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland; something which Unionists were totally opposed to (Hennessey, 2015, p. 112).

After the signing of the Sunningdale Agreement between the two governments in 1973, there was an increase in violence by paramilitary groups (Nicholson, 2009, p. 58) and the Agreement didn't hold.

5.2 Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985

The fundamental conditions for any prospect of peacebuilding were not present in Northern Ireland at the time of the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973. As a result, the Agreement collapsed and instigated chaos rather than harmony in Northern Ireland (McKaughan, 2018).

Until the mid-1980s, the political instability and violence continued in Northern Ireland, with numerous bombing attacks that killed countless civilians, Nationalists and Unionists. As mentioned previously, in this period the hunger strikes of 1981 also occurred (O’Kane, 2007).

In the face of the constant cycle of violence that characterized this period, in 1983 the Irish and British governments started to negotiate an agreement to bring peace to Northern Ireland again. According to Goodall (2007), the proposal for a new agreement came from the Irish government, due to a recognition:

“(1) that Irish unity was simply not attainable in the foreseeable future; (2) that the nationalists minority in the North was alienated from the institutions of government, law and order there; and (3) that Sinn Féin was capitalizing on this alienation so as to marginalize the SDLP and become a major political force, not just in the North, but in the South too, thereby threatening the stability of the whole Island of Ireland” (Goodall, 2007, p. 125).

It is relevant to mention that the Irish and British governments had different ways of dealing with the conflict:

“the approach of the Irish government since 1969 has been dominated by the primacy of politics and diplomacy, supported by appropriate security measures, and a determination to find a political route out of conflict, even when confronted by other approaches. British governments in dealing with Ireland over the century have used armed power, as well as agents and auxiliaries, to counter popular movements and uprisings” (Mansergh, 2007, p. 110)

In relation to the 1983 Agreement, both the Irish and British Prime Ministers at the time, Garret Fitzgerald and Margaret Thatcher, realized the need to cooperate in order to solve the conflict in Northern Ireland. The UK was mainly concerned with its public image, taking into consideration the international condemnation of the hunger strikes that were happening in Northern Ireland around that time (O’Kane, 2007).

The new agreement that Ireland and the UK were negotiating had a central objective for the Irish government: to strengthen the SDLP Nationalist party against the IRA (Irish Republican Army) and Sinn Féin (Mansergh, 2007). Furthermore, the Irish government intended, with the agreement, to combat what it considered as the alienation of Nationalists in Northern Ireland, which had increased due to the strengthening of Sinn Féin (Madden, 2010). For the British government, the agreement was a way to improve both its security through cooperation with the Irish government, and its international image (Mansergh, 2007).

Moreover, with a new agreement, both governments aimed to re-establish the 'idea' of the power-sharing government model. However, both governments were concerned that the approval of the power-sharing model would probably be rejected, again, by the Unionists. This would again put the success of the agreement at risk. Thus, despite the implementation of the power-sharing model being on both governments' agendas, it was not the primary objective of the agreement, because both knew that it would probably be too difficult to implement (O'Kane, 2007, p. 716).

The Anglo-Irish (Hillsborough) Agreement was signed in 1985 by the Irish and British governments, under the respective Prime Ministers - Garret Fitzgerald and Margaret Thatcher. "The official committee included Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe, William Whitelaw, and Northern Irish Secretary of State Douglas Hurd. The committee met with Northern Irish political leaders, except Sinn Féin, during the peace process but excluded them from official participation like that seen during the Sunningdale Agreement Conference" (McKaughan, 2018, pp. 36-37). In addition, Republican and Loyalist paramilitary forces were excluded from the Anglo-Irish Agreement negotiations (McKaughan, 2018).

The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 started from the awareness of the British and Irish governments of the need and will:

"to develop the unique relationship between their peoples and the close co-operation between their countries (...) recognizing the need for continuing efforts to reconcile and to acknowledge the rights of the two major traditions that in Ireland, represented on the one hand by those who wish for no change in the present status of Northern Ireland and on the other hand by those who aspire to a sovereign united Ireland achieved by peaceful means and through agreement (...) recognising that a condition of genuine reconciliation and dialogue between unionists and nationalists is mutual recognition and acceptance of each other's rights" (Anglo Irish Agreement, 1985 cited in Elliot, 2007, p. 228);

After the above needs had been stipulated by the British and Irish governments, they established the principles to be present in the new agreement:

1. Principle of consent – established the assumption that an amendment to the constitutional statute of Northern Ireland would only be approved if that was the will of the majority of the Northern Irish population.

2. Establishment of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council.

3. Creation of an Intergovernmental Conference - which would deal with: “(i) political matters; (ii) security and related matters; (iii) legal matters, including the administration of justice; (iv) the promotion of cross-border co-operation” (Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985 cited in Elliot, 2007, p. 229).

As shown in point 1 above, one of the aims of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 was to reaffirm and reinforce the principle of consent (Ginty et al., 2001). For this, the Agreement proposed the creation of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, which would see the two governments meet and discuss issues in relation to Northern Ireland. With the creation of this structure, both governments intended to promote cooperation between each other, in order to solve problems that could cause instability in Northern Ireland (McKaughan, 2018).

The Agreement presented in its article 10:

“(a) The two Governments shall co-operate to promote the economic and social development of those areas of both parts of Ireland which have suffered most severely from the consequences of the instability of recent years, and shall consider the possibility of securing international support for this work.

(b) (...) the Conference shall be a Framework for the promotion of co-operation between the two parts of Ireland concerning cross-border aspects of economic, social and cultural matters in relation to which the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland continues to exercise authority.

(c) If responsibility is devolved in respect of certain matters in the economic, social or cultural areas currently within the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, machinery will need to be established by the responsible authorities in the North and South for practical co-operation in respect of cross-border aspects of these issues” (Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985 cited in Elliot, 2007, p. 233).

Although the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 looked promising, it did not achieve the results that the Irish and British governments wanted and hoped for. According to Margaret Thatcher, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the agreement did not fulfill the objective that was at the top of her ‘agenda’: to solve the security problem through cooperation with the Irish government, because the violence continued (McLoughlin, 2014, p. 7).

The Irish government's expectations of the 1985 agreement were also not met. Northern Ireland's state policy and its judicial practices, which needed to tackle Nationalist alienation in order to lessen the support being enjoyed by Sinn Féin, did not change significantly with the agreement. Due to this, the Irish government's main aim for the Agreement to stop the growth in popularity of Sinn Féin was not achieved (McLoughlin, 2014, p. 7).

The lack of consensus between the two governments on what the main priorities of the Agreement should have been was one of the main factors that led to its collapse. Another factor that contributed to the failure of the Anglo-Irish Agreement concerned the lack of support from and inclusion of paramilitary forces and Unionists in the negotiation of the agreement (Todd, 2009).

Similar to the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement, the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement ultimately failed. It did not establish a political agreement to combat the violence between the Loyalists and Republicans or achieve peace in Northern Ireland (Goodall, 2007).

5.3 Good Friday Agreement of 1998

The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 between the United Kingdom and Ireland failed to resolve the conflict in Northern Ireland. Discontent among both Unionists and the Republican armed forces in relation to the failed agreement manifested itself through increased violence. There were even episodes of shootings against innocent people, such as the attack on a memorial ceremony in Enniskillen by the IRA (Irish Republican Army) in 1987 (Fenton, 2018).

However, despite the agreement ultimately failing, there were opportunities for both governments to identify the main reasons behind it not working, rectify those failings and create the necessary conditions for an agreement that would work (O'Kane, 2007).

In 1987, dialogue between Sinn Féin and the SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party) began. The intention of the dialogue was to end the violence in Northern Ireland and to achieve a ceasefire by the IRA (Feeney, 2004). In 1991, the leader of the SDLP party, John Hume, presented a declaration (the *Downing Street Declaration* or the *Joint Declaration*) to the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) of the Republic of Ireland, Charles Haughey. That declaration would serve as the basis for a future agreement. When Haughey resigned, his successor, Albert Reynolds, continued the dialogue with intermediary representatives of Sinn Féin, with the aim of consolidating the *Downing Street Declaration* and ultimately ending the conflict (Mansergh, 2007).

The Joint Declaration was issued in December 1993 by the Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams and by the leader of the SDLP, John Hume, and it was accepted by Albert Reynolds. It reaffirmed the acceptance by the British government of a united Ireland, if that was the will of the majority of the Northern Irish population; and it also reaffirmed that the British Government had no “selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland: its primary interest was to see peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement among all the people who inhabit the Island (...)” (Downing Street Declaration, 1993 cited in Elliot, 2007, pp. 249-250).

Furthermore,

“Both Governments accept that Irish unity would be achieved only by those who favour this outcome persuading those who do not, peacefully and without coercion or violence, and that, if in the future a majority of the people of Northern Ireland are so persuaded, both Governments will support and give legislative effect to their wish” (Downing Street Declaration, 1993 cited in Elliot, 2007, p. 251).

The Downing Street Declaration of 1993 created the perfect opportunity for an IRA (Irish Republican Army) ceasefire, because they would be allowed to participate in political negotiations by engaging in the ceasefire (Mansergh, 2007). Also, because the declaration was clear in what constituted ‘a united Ireland’, it was broadly welcomed by Unionists and Nationalists, as well as the Republican forces (Fenton, 2018). “For the first time in decades, both communities appeared to be able to tolerate the declaration” (Fenton, 2018, p. 33).

Following the declaration, there was a reduction in the number of violent attacks in Northern Ireland from 1994, especially by the IRA, which declared a ceasefire on 31st August, followed by the Loyalist forces who also declared a ceasefire in October 1994 (Fenton, 2018).

Following the Downing Street Declaration of 1993, the *Framework Document* was created in 1995. It promoted the idea that the British, Irish, and Northern Irish political forces should take advantage of the IRA and Loyalist ceasefires and look to establish an agreement that would totally end the violence in Northern Ireland. For this, both the British and Irish governments deployed their political resources in order to secure a new agreement involving the relevant political parties in Northern Ireland (The Framework Document, 1995 cited in Elliot, 2007). Furthermore,

“The two Governments will work together with the parties to achieve a comprehensive accommodation, the implementation of which would include interlocking and mutually supportive institutions across the three strands, including: (a) structures within Northern Ireland (...) – to enable elected representatives in

Northern Ireland to exercise shared administrative and legislative control [...] (b) North/South institutions (...) – with clear identity and purpose, to enable representatives of democratic institutions, North and South, to enter into new, co-operative and constructive relationships [...] (c) East-West structures (...) - to enable the existing basis for co-operation between the two Governments [...]” (The Framework Document, 1995 cited in Elliot, 2007, p. 255).

The *Framework Document* presented the idea that “both Governments would encourage democratic representatives from both jurisdictions in Ireland to adopt a Charter or Covenant, which might reflect and endorse agreed measures for the protection of the fundamental rights of everyone living in Ireland” (The Framework Document, 1995).

The UK Prime Minister, John Major, outlined some steps to be followed in order to achieve peace in Northern Ireland, such as dismantling paramilitary forces before negotiations of the new agreement could begin. However, in 1996 there was a turning point, as the IRA broke its ceasefire. Following this event, the Irish and British governments decided that the negotiations for the new agreement would need to be totally inclusive, and that all the parties in Northern Ireland would be convened on 10th June 1996; each party could decide whether or not they wanted to participate in the negotiations (Owen, 2007).

In June 1996, the British and Irish governments managed to agree to proceed with negotiations for the new agreement, despite several attempts to ruin the peacebuilding process (Mitchell, 2007). One attempt was a bombing by the IRA (who broke its ceasefire) in February of 1996 at the Canary Wharf in London, which resulted in the deaths of two civilians, as well as property damage (Feeney, 2004).

Negotiations for the new agreement finally began in September 1996 and were open to all parties and paramilitary forces. The two governments decided that they would not require the dismantling of the IRA (Irish Republican Army) as a prerequisite for Sinn Féin to participate in the negotiations. Instead, each party’s participation in the negotiations was dependent on the IRA’s acceptance of a new six-month ceasefire (Fenton, 2018). This new ceasefire began in July 1996, but it didn’t last for the required six months.

Due to the IRA’s unwillingness to stick to the six-month ceasefire, in 1998 the two governments decided to exclude Sinn Féin from the negotiations. However, the “other parties, primarily led by the UUP on the unionist side and the SDLP on the nationalist side, continued negotiations in earnest” (Fenton, 2018, pp. 72-73).

In April 1998, the new agreement was announced. It was called the Good Friday Agreement and established the following principles:

1. Democratic institutions in Northern Ireland:

1.1 Assembly – composed of 108 members elected by proportional representation (PR) instead of the previously used method (FPTP - First Past The Post); full legislative and executive power; the Assembly would elect the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister through inter-community voting; finally, it (the Assembly) would depend on the North/South Ministerial Council, insofar as one would not function properly without the other (The Good Friday Agreement, 1998 cited in Elliot, 2007);

1.2 North/South Ministerial Council – is a consultative body that depends on the Assembly, (one does not function properly without the other); its objective would be: to develop consultation, co-operation and action within the island of Ireland (...) on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the Administrations, North and South. (The Good Friday Agreement, 1998: Strand Two); it would be represented in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland as follows: Northern Ireland would be represented by the Northern Ireland Prime (First) Minister, Deputy Prime (First) Minister and other ministers; in the Republic of Ireland, it would be represented by the Taoiseach and other relevant ministers. In general, the North/South Ministerial Council's main function would be to make mutual interest policy decisions that would involve the entire island at the border level (The Good Friday Agreement, 1998);

1.3 British-Irish Council – “established under a new British-Irish Agreement to promote the harmonious and mutually beneficial development of the totality of relationships among the peoples of these islands” (The Good Friday Agreement, 1998 cited in Elliot, 2007, p. 269); composed of “representatives of the British and Irish Governments, devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales” (The Good Friday Agreement, 1998: Strand 3); will operate by consensus of all members who participate in decision-making of the common interest;

1.4 British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference – at Summit level it will bring together the British and Irish (Taoiseach) Prime Ministers, otherwise, their respective governments will be represented by appropriated ministers. Advisers (in security and policy) would attend the conference if appropriate; its objective would be “to promote bilateral co-operation at all levels on all matters of mutual interest within the competence of both Governments” (The Good Friday Agreement, 1998: Strand 3); it would deal with matters relating to the areas of justice, security, prison, rights and politics in Northern Ireland (The Good Friday Agreement, 1998: Strand 3).

In addition, the agreement included, like the previous agreements, the principle of consent, which concerns the amendment of the constitutional statute of Northern Ireland; that is, if a united Ireland is the will of the majority of the Irish population, the UK government will not object to the decision.

The agreement included a political structure according to the power-sharing model, “which would mean that the largest nationalist party and largest unionist party would exercise power together” (Fenton, 2018, p. 39). Furthermore, “The agreement also contained provisions on decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary weapons, policing, human rights, UK security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of prisoners” (Horowitz, 2002, p. 193).

Another change that took place with this agreement was that, instead of having one Prime Minister in Northern Ireland, there would be one representative from each group: a Unionist and a Nationalist, who would occupy the positions of Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister respectively. Furthermore, “in recognition of the human rights abuses which were alleged to have occurred throughout the conflict, often at the hands of the British or Northern Irish states, a new emphasis on human rights and equality would be key to the new government” (Fenton, 2018, p. 40).

From 1969 to 1999, significant changes occurred in Northern Ireland, such as the abolition of the local government in Stormont and the consequent transfer of control to Westminster, as well as the constant bombings and shootings between loyalist and nationalist paramilitary groups. Over time, some proposals were presented with the aim of ending the conflict, such as the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973, the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, and the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, which finally ended the conflict through the creation of a pact between the Irish and British governments.

In general, those three agreements were based on some shared common basic principles, such as the principle of consent, the creation of an Anglo-Irish Council and an intergovernmental conference. The Good Friday agreement fostered the creation of some new institutions, such as the North/South Ministerial Council, and the creation of some important clauses, like the human rights, dismantlement of weaponry, and security clauses. One of the crucial changes introduced by the Good Friday agreement was the change of voting system - from the ‘First Past The Post’ model to the method of proportional representation with a single transferable vote. These changes in the political system, as well as the implementation of a model based on power-sharing, were the key elements that served as the basis for the attainment of peace in Northern Ireland, which remains to the present day, in accordance with the principles of the Good Friday agreement.

The Northern Ireland peace process can be defined as a ‘lengthy’ process. It involved several stages of negotiation, failed attempts to achieve an agreement and difficulties in getting the support of all the parties involved in the conflict, whether political or paramilitary. There is not a verified date that the negotiation of the Good Friday Agreement precisely began, but authors such as Brian Feeney and Martin Melaugh, highlight the year 1988 as the starting point. It was the year that the SDLP (Social

Democratic and Labour Party) leader John Hume and the President of Sinn Féin, Gerry Adams, met with the first attempt to find a political solution for the conflict in Northern Ireland (Melaugh, 2006).

6. Conclusion

Since the 1990s, the world has become more volatile in terms of conflict, with a significant increase in internal conflicts. Previously, the international system was characterized by the occurrence of conflicts and wars between countries and superpowers for reasons of territorial possession and economic or military power, such as the First World War, the Second World War, and the Cold War.

However, with the end of the Cold War (1990), new conflicts began to emerge more consistently, for differing causes. Gradually, the nationalist sentiment was being reinforced and ethnic divisions in certain countries grew.

As these ethnic divisions became more evident, and the difference in access to the same rights (political, economic, religious, or social) between groups became more apparent, more conflicts took place, and violence became the norm. In this context, new studies in the area of peace and conflict resolution were developed, and the concepts of peace, conflict and security were restructured to encompass new dimensions; this consequently affected the production of new models of conflict resolution, by coming up with proposals on best practices in relation to instituting democracy in societies divided by different ethnic groups.

As proposed at the beginning of this study, the concepts of violence, peace, security, conflict, and power-sharing were explained. This made it possible to determine the complexity of these concepts, which led to the study and analysis of different ideas and definitions. Authors differ in their own perceptions of peace, violence, and conflict; in the cases and situations in which such terms may apply and the limits of their application, as well as the dimensions that each of them include. These differing perceptions are also visible in the concept of power-sharing, where there are two divergent models that establish a set of conditions to solve a conflict and to institute peace in societies which are ethnically divided.

Even though it took place before the end of the Cold War, the case of 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland enables the understanding of the benefits and limitations of using a model of power-sharing, and the evolution from a state of conflict to a state of "negative peace" or "positive peace". Furthermore, in relation to the concepts considered relevant for analysis and understanding of this dissertation's theme,

it was necessary to mention the types of violence listed by Johan Galtung: namely physical, structural, and cultural in the Northern Ireland conflict.

Between 1919 and 1921, there was a conflict over the independence of the Irish territory from the United Kingdom. Nationalists intended to end British control over Ireland and unionists wanted the union to remain. This conflict ended in 1921 with the signing of the Anglo-Irish agreement between the United Kingdom and Ireland. This recognized Ireland as an independent state comprising of twenty-six counties in the south, while the remaining six were controlled by Northern Ireland, which belonged to the United Kingdom.

However, this agreement did not last for a long time. In 1969 a new conflict started in Northern Ireland between the nationalists and unionists because of limitations on political rights for the Catholic minority. The Catholic community was not represented in the local parliament in Stormont, and was disqualified from voting. This is because the voting method until then was the 'FPTP' (First Past The Post) system, in which the candidate with the highest number of votes in each constituency becomes a member of parliament, and all other votes are disregarded. In this sense, the conflict began based on the civil rights movement by Northern Irish nationalists, until it escalated into a direct confrontation between republican and loyalist paramilitary forces. The conflict endured over 30 years of attacks and counterattacks between both parties. Nationalists (the Catholic population) wanted the same rights that the unionists (the Protestant population) had, along with the unification of Ireland; unionists wanted to maintain control over all political and social matters in Northern Ireland, and also to stay in the United Kingdom.

As the violence escalated, there were attempts by both the British and Irish governments to reach an agreement. There were some proposals of agreements over the years, such as the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973, the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, and the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Between them, only one held successfully, the Good Friday agreement, which ended the conflict and established peace.

One of the most important changes that the Good Friday agreement brought was the replacement of the voting system: the 'First Past The Post' system was replaced by the method of proportional representation, with one vote transferable and one unique government based on the sharing of power between unionists and nationalists, with structures that introduced mechanisms of cooperation between the governments of the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom. It also provided the possibility for participation by the Irish government on matters in its interests, as well as an advisory role in certain areas.

Considering what was explained in the literature review regarding the concept of power-sharing, and the analysis of studies and contributions by several authors such as Horowitz and Lijphart (who created two distinct models: the centripetal and the consociational model, respectively), it appears that the consociational model was introduced in the Good Friday agreement in 1998.

These two models defend two distinct views regarding the types of democratic systems that can be established in societies with deep ethnic divisions.

On one hand, in his centripetal model, Horowitz advocated a presidential or semi-presidential political system, with an electoral method based on a simple majority. In addition, he supported the idea of a convergence of interests in pre-election coalitions but refused territorial political decentralization. On the other hand, with his consociational model, Lijphart proposed a way of achieving peaceful coexistence between different ethnic groups, a parliamentary political system based on a single transferable voting method of proportional representation and supported territorial political decentralization. According to Lijphart “in parliamentary systems, power means participation in the cabinet, and maximum power means holding as many of the cabinet positions as possible” (Lijphart, 2012, p. 81).

Based on the study of the two models of power-sharing, as well as analysis of the Northern Ireland peace process and the study of the agreements that were signed until the end of the conflict and the establishment of peace with the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, it can be concluded that the power-sharing model that was used to form the Good Friday Agreement was similar to Lijphart's consociational model - a parliamentary system based on proportional representation. This can be seen in the 1998 agreement as “political parties from both sides of the ethnic divide agreed to a devolved system of government composed of the Northern Ireland Assembly and a joint cross-community power-sharing executive. There was to be mandatory cross-community voting on major issues and electoral representation (...) by party-list” (Noble, 2011, p. 5).

While it is recognized that the model employed in the Good Friday Agreement is the consociational model, it is important to point out that previous governance model in force was the centripetal model, which advocated a democratic system based on majority method. However, this model did not work in Northern Ireland, because the vast majority of power was in the hands of the Protestant community, and Catholic's had no right to vote. The method that was being used (the centripetal model) deepened the ethnic division between the two communities and gave rise to two large-scale violent conflicts, which made evident the need to change the democratic model in place (achieved by the Good Friday Agreement). Since the principles of the consociational model were introduced in 1998, Northern Ireland has had more than 20 years of lasting peace.

From 1916 to 1999, Northern Ireland underwent multiple changes in political, economic, and social terms, with the abolition of some institutions and the creation of new institutions and governance structures, and a political system based on proportional representation.

The case of Northern Ireland allows the understanding of various challenges that can be faced when trying to institute peace in deeply divided societies which are marked by strong ethnic and political divisions. The task of trying to end a conflict and establish structures for peace becomes even more difficult when the parties do not agree on the basic principles that should be introduced into any agreement.

Power-sharing models have a fundamental role in the resolution of internal conflicts; they can promote peaceful coexistence between two groups with different political and religious views. In relation to enabling the sharing of power, it is necessary to create certain institutions and political structures that will facilitate healthy debate between ethnic groups on matters of mutual interest, in order to avoid any increase in animosity and, consequently, the restart of conflict.

The concept of power-sharing is based on the establishment of a democratic system which is founded upon the sharing of power between opposition parties. The power-sharing model, centripetal or consociational, cannot be applied equally in all conflicts; this is because each conflict has different characteristics which must be considered at the time of negotiations. Only by taking these competing characteristics and desires into account will it be possible to achieve the permanent ending of a conflict, and to lay the foundations for a stable and lasting peace between groups of different ethnicities, religious and political outlooks.

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